Relatives of the Muslim husband cannot be accused of the offence of pronouncement of triple talaq; the offence can only be committed by a Muslim man

Sec. 7(c) of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019 does not impose an absolute bar on granting regular or anticipatory bail

    Under Section 3, a pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife has been rendered void and illegal. Under Section 4, a Muslim husband who pronounces talaq upon his wife, as referred to in Section 3, is punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three years. The prohibition in Sections 3 and 4 is evidently one which operates in relation to a Muslim husband alone. This is supported by the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill 2019, when it was introduced in the Parliament. The reasons for the introduction of the bill specifically stated that the bill was to give effect to the ruling of this court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India [(2017) 9 SCC 1], and to „liberate‟ Muslim women from the customary practice of talaq-e-biddat (divorce by triple talaq) by Muslim men. It is in this context that the provisions of Section 7 would have to be interpreted. Section 7 provides as follows:

“7. Offences to be cognizable, compoundable, etc: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, -

(a) an offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable, if information relating to the commission of the offence is given to an officer in charge of a police station by the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced or any person related to her by blood or marriage;

(b) an offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable, at the instance of the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced with the permission of the Magistrate, on such terms and conditions as he may determine;

(c) no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall be released on bail unless the Magistrate, on an application filed by the accused and after hearing the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced, is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for granting bail to such person."

    The provisions of Section 7(c) apply to the Muslim husband. The offence which is created by Section 3 is on the pronouncement of a talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife. Section 3 renders the pronouncement of talaq void and illegal. Section 4 makes the Act of the Muslim husband punishable with imprisonment. Thus, on a preliminary analysis,

it is clear that the appellant as the mother-in-law of the second respondent cannot be accused of the offence of pronouncement of triple talaq under the Act as the offence can only be committed by a Muslim man.[Para No.7]

filing of a first information report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438 of Cr.P.C.

(i) Grant of an order of unconditional anticipatory bail would be “plainly contrary to the very terms of Section 438.” Even though the terms of Section 438(1) confer discretion, Section 438(2) “confers on the court the power to include such conditions in the direction as it may think fit in the light of the facts of the particular case, including the conditions mentioned in clauses (i) to (iv) of that sub-section.”

(ii) Grant of an order under Section 438(1) does not per se hamper investigation of an offence; Section 438(1)(i) and (ii) enjoin that an accused/applicant should co-operate with investigation. Sibbia (supra) also stated that courts can fashion appropriate conditions governing bail, as well. One condition can be that if the police make out a case of likely recovery of objects or discovery of facts under Section 27 (of the Evidence Act, 1872), the accused may be taken into custody. Given that there is no formal method prescribed by Section 46 of the Code if recovery is made during a statement (to the police) and pursuant to the accused volunteering the fact, it would be a case of recovery during “deemed arrest” (Para 19 of Sibbia).

(iii) The accused is not obliged to make out a special case for grant of anticipatory bail; reading an otherwise wide power would fetter the court’s discretion. Whenever an application (for relief under Section 438) is moved, discretion has to be always exercised judiciously, and with caution, having regard to the facts of every case. (Para 21, Sibbia).

(iv) While the power of granting anticipatory bail is not ordinary, at the same time, its use is not confined to exceptional cases (Para 22, Sibbia).

(v) It is not justified to require courts to only grant anticipatory bail in special cases made out by accused, since the power is extraordinary, or that several considerations – spelt out in Section 437- or other considerations, are to be kept in mind. (Para 24-25, Sibbia).

(vi) Overgenerous introduction (or reading into) of constraints on the power to grant anticipatory bail would render it Constitutionally vulnerable. Since fair procedure is part of Article 21, the court should not throw the provision (i.e. Section 438) open to challenge “by reading words in it which are not to be found therein.” (Para 26).

(vii) There is no “inexorable rule” that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the applicant is the target of mala fides. There are several relevant considerations to be factored in, by the court, while considering whether to grant or refuse anticipatory bail. Nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the accused’s presence not being secured during trial; a reasonable apprehension that the witnesses might be tampered with, and “the larger interests of the public or the state” are some of the considerations. A person seeking relief (of anticipatory bail) continues to be a man presumed to be innocent. (Para 31, Sibbia).

(viii) There can be no presumption that any class of accused- i.e. those accused of particular crimes, or those belonging to the poorer sections, are likely to abscond. (Para 32, Sibbia).

(ix) Courts should exercise their discretion while considering applications for anticipatory bail (as they do in the case of bail). It would be unwise to divest or limit their discretion by prescribing “inflexible rules of general application.”. (Para 33, Sibbia).

(x) The apprehension of an applicant, who seeks anticipatory bail (about his imminent or possible arrest) should be based on reasonable grounds, and rooted on objective facts or materials, capable of examination and evaluation, by the court, and not based on vague un-spelt apprehensions. (Para 35, Sibbia).

(xi) The grounds for seeking anticipatory bail should be examined by the High Court or Court of Session, which should not leave the question for decision by the concerned Magistrate. (Para 36, Sibbia).

(xii) Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent for exercising power under Section 438; it can be done on a showing of reasonable belief of imminent arrest (of the applicant). (Para 37, Sibbia).

(xiii) Anticipatory bail can be granted even after filing of an FIR- as long as the applicant is not arrested. However, after arrest, an application for anticipatory bail is not maintainable. (Para 38-39, Sibbia).

Separate F.I.R. can be lodged by every depositor if they are cheated on different dates

Each instance of cheating of every investor/depositor would constitute an independent offence even if it is committed as a part of single conspiracy

    The principal issue herein is with regard to the applicability of Section 220 of the Cr.P.C. as well as the protection provided under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution to a case of inducement, allurement and cheating of a large number of investors/depositors in a criminal conspiracy. The issue posed is whether the offence of cheating - by acceptance of deposits made by individual investors - and there would be multiple such investors, would all constitute the "same transaction" - because the conspiracy or design may be the same or, whether, the act of cheating - by acceptance of deposits made by different investors, would constitute separate transactions - because each act of inducement, allurement and consequential cheating would be unique. The question is whether such transactions could be amalgamated and clubbed together into a single FIR, by showing one investor as the complainant, and the others as the witnesses. Consequently, convicted under one such case would pre-empt prosecution under the other pending cases.[Para No.22]

..........

    Thus even Section 220 does not help the Petitioner as will apply where any one series of acts are so connected together as to form the same transaction and where more than

one offence is committed, there can be a joint trial. In the present case, as is borne out from the record, different people have been alleged to have been defrauded by the Petitioner and the Company and therefore each offence is a distinct one and cannot be regarded as constituting a single series of facts/ transaction.[Para No.31]

Victims are entitled to claim compensation for incidents that occurred even prior to the coming into force of section 357A(4) of Cr.P.C.

A question of seminal importance has arisen in this case. The query raised relates to the victim compensation scheme under Section 357A(4) of Cr.P.C. and its applicability. Is the provision retrospective or prospective in its application? To paraphrase the query: Would the victim, of a crime that occurred prior to 31.12.2009, be entitled to claim compensation under Section 357A(4) of the Cr. P.C.[Para No.1]

    The facts, though not relevant to be narrated in detail, is in a nutshell as follows:

Respondents 2 to 4 are the legal heirs of one late Sri.Sivadas. In a motor vehicle accident that took place on 26-03-2008, Sri. Sivadas succumbed to his injuries. Though a crime was registered by the Alappuzha Traffic Police, the accused could not be identified or traced and the trial has not taken place. In 2013, the legal heirs of late Sivadas applied to the District Legal Services Authority, Alappuzha, seeking compensation from the State under Section 357A(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity 'the Cr.P.C').[Para No.2]

    Pursuant to the application, an enquiry, as contemplated under Section 357A(5) Cr.P.C, was conducted through the Additional District Judge, Alappuzha, who was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. The enquiry report was submitted on 12-09-2013. The report revealed that the applicants are the legal heirs of late Sivadas and that at the time of death he was aged 52 years and a casual labourer. It further stated that considering the circumstances, an amount of Rs.3,03,000/- (Rupees Three lakhs three thousand only) was sufficient compensation that could be awarded to the dependents of late Sri.Sivadas. On the above basis, the 1st respondent by Ext.P1 order, directed the State of Kerala to pay an amount of Rs.3,03,000/- to the dependents of late Sivadas under Section 357A(5) of the Cr.P.C. Ext.P1 is under challenge.[Para No.3]

..............

    As a substantive law, the aforesaid statutory provision will have only prospective application. However, in the case of Section 357A(1)(4)&(5) Cr.P.C., there is a difference. Rehabilitation of the victim is the scope, purport and import of Section 357A(4) Cr.P.C., when read along with Section 357A (1) Cr.P.C. This is more explicit when understood in the background of the recommendation of the 154th report of the Law Commission of India. Rehabilitation of the victim was a remedial measure. It remedied the weakness in the then existing provisions for compensating the crime victims, especially to those victims, whose perpetrators had not been traced. The provision is remedial. Remedial statutes or provisions are also known as welfare, beneficent or social justice oriented legislation.[Para No.27]

    While interpreting a provision brought in as a remedial measure, that too, as a means of welfare for the victims of crimes, in which the perpetrators or offenders have not been identified and in which trial has not taken place, the Court must always be wary and vigilant of not defeating the welfare intended by the legislature. In remedial provisions, as well as in welfare legislation, the words of the statute must be construed in such a manner that it provides the most complete remedy which the phraseology permits. The Court must, always, in such circumstances, interpret the words in such a manner, that the relief contemplated by the provision, is secured and not denied to the class intended to be benefited.[Para No.28]

    While interpreting Section 357A(4) Cr.P.C., this Court cannot be oblivious of the agony stricken face of the victim and the trauma and travails such victims have undergone, especially when their offenders have not even been identified or traced out or a trial conducted. The agonizing face of the victims looms large upon this Court while considering the question raised for decision.[Para No.29]

    With the aforesaid principles hovering over Section 357A(4)&(5) Cr.P.C., the provision ought to be interpreted in such a manner that it benefits victims. If the said benefit could be conferred without violating the principles of law, then courts must adopt that approach. A substantive law that is remedial, can reckon a past event for applying the law prospectively. Such an approach does not make the substantive law retrospective in its operation. On the other hand, it only caters to the intention of the legislature.[Para No.30]

     In other words, when an application is made by a victim of a crime that occurred prior to the coming into force of Section 357A(4) Cr.P.C.,

a prospective benefit is given, taking into reckoning an antecedent fact. Adopting such an interpretation does not make the statute or the provision retrospective in operation. It only confers prospective benefits, in certain cases, to even antecedent facts. The statute will remain prospective in application but will draw life from a past event also. The rule against retrospectivity of substantive law is not violated or affected, merely because part of the requisites for action under the provision is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. Merely because a prospective benefit under a remedial statutory provision is measured by or dependent on antecedent facts, it does not necessarily make the provision retrospective in operation.[Para No.31]

When police refused to register F.I.R. the complainant must approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of CrPC and not to the High Court directly

While referring to the judgment of Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe (supra), it is observed that if the High Courts entertain such writ petitions seeking registration of FIR, then they will be flooded with such writ petitions and will not be able to do any other work, except dealing with them. It is specifically held that the complainant must avail of his alternate

remedy to approach the Magistrate concerned under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C and if he does so, the Magistrate will ensure, if prima facie he is satisfied, registration of the FIR and also ensure a proper investigation in the matter. While approving the aforenoted view, the Supreme Court has set aside the direction of the High Court for registration of the FIR and has directed the respondent thereto to approach the court of Magistrate if deem appropriate and necessary. Thus, the law on the registration of FIR is well settled and has been reiterated in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court as noted herein above.[Para No.4]

    In the present case, the petitioner has not approached the concerned Magistrate and has directly approached this Court for the aforesaid prayer.[Para No.5]

    Under the circumstances and in light of the observations made by the Apex Court, the writ petition is rejected since the petitioner has the remedy to approach the approach the concerned Magistrate under section 156(3) of the Cr.PC.[Para No.6]

Subordinate to the appointing authority can not grant sanction to prosecute

Additional Collector holding charge of District Collector can not give sanction to prosecute in corruption case when employee is appointed by District Collector

    The sanction for prosecution can be granted by the authority competent to remove person. The appointment authority was Collector. PW-4 was subordinate to Collector. He was working as Additional Collector. The prosecution is relying upon the order handing over the charge to PW-4. The documents were produced on re-examination of the witness. The question which arises for consideration is that assuming that the charge was handed over to PW-4, on account of leave of District Collector, whether the charge of according sanction to prosecute the accused stands transferred to him. There is no satisfactory evidence on record to substantiate this fact. The approach of PW-4 appears to be casual. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to some provisions of Maharashtra Civil Services Rules to bring home and contended that District Collector was appointing and removing authority.[Para No.21]

    It is submitted that, disciplinary authority cannot be inferior to the appointing authority. In the present case the collector being the appointing authority of the applicant, the additional collector did not have the power to remove him from service. Article 311 (1) of the constitution of India creates a safeguard where in no person who is a member of the Civil services of the Union or the state or an All Indian Service or a civil service or who holds a civil post under the union or State shall be removed by an authority sub ordinate to him. In the present case PW-3 at the relevant time was functioning as the Additional collector of Kolhapur. PW-3 in his examination in Chief makes a positive assertion that the Collector of the District is the Appointing and the removing Authority of the Appellant/accused. The Appointment order of the Appellant was produced on record by the said witness and the same is at (Exh.119). The PW 3 admits in his cross examination that the Post of the Additional Collector and Collector are different. The onus of proving a valid sanction is on the prosecution and hence it was incumbent upon the prosecution to bring on record any documents which would demonstrate that the power of Appointment and the removal of the Appellant vested with the Additional Collector. The prosecution has not produced any documents in this regard. The aforesaid witness was re-examined by the prosecution and the documents at Exh.124 is a charge report dated 11th April, 2006. It can be seen that the Collector holding regular charge was proceedings on leave and hence the Additional Charge of the District was being handed over to the PW-3. In the aforesaid charge report it is no where mentioned that the PW-3 had the authority to remove the Appellant or persons of equivalent rank from service and hence (Exh.124) would not come to the aid and assistance of the prosecution.

In fact Article 311 (1) does not permit such a delegation of powers and hence assuming without admitting that there was such a delegation, then the same would nonest in the eyes of law and the same would be in conflict with the constitutional safeguard created under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India.[Para No.22]

Dispute between landlord and tenant is arbitrable in case of lease and it is non arbitrable in case if Rent Act is applicable

Such equitable protection does not mean that the disputes relating to those aspects between the landlord and the tenant is not arbitrable and that only a Court is empowered to waive the forfeiture or not in the circumstance stated in the provision. In our view, when the disputes arise between the landlord and tenant with regard to determination of lease under the TP Act, the landlord to secure possession of the leased property in a normal circumstance is required to institute a suit in the Court which has jurisdiction. However, if the parties in the contract of lease or in such other manner have agreed upon the alternate mode of dispute resolution through arbitration the landlord would be entitled to invoke the arbitration clause and make a claim before the learned Arbitrator. Even in such proceedings, if the circumstances as contained in Section 114 and 114A of TP Act arise, it could be brought up before the learned Arbitrator who would take note of the same and act in accordance with the law qua passing the award. In other words, if in the arbitration proceedings the landlord has sought for an award of ejectment on the ground that the lease has been forfeited since the tenant has failed to pay the rent and breached the express condition for payment of rent or such other breach and in such proceedings the tenant pays or tenders the rent to the lessor or remedies such other breach, it would be open for the Arbitrator to take note of Section 114, 114A of TP Act and pass appropriate award in the nature as a Court would have considered that aspect while exercising the discretion.[Para No.16]

    On the other hand, the disputes arising under the Rent Acts will have to be looked at from a different view point and therefore not arbitrable in those cases. This is for the reason that

notwithstanding the terms and conditions entered into between the landlord and tenant to regulate the tenancy, if the eviction or tenancy is governed by a special statute, namely, the Rent Act the premises being amenable to the provisions of the Act would also provide statutory protection against eviction and the courts specified in the Act alone will be conferred jurisdiction to order eviction or to resolve such other disputes. In such proceedings under special statutes the issue to be considered by the jurisdictional court is not merely the terms and conditions entered into between the landlord and tenant but also other aspects such as the bonafide requirement, comparative hardship etc. even if the case for eviction is made out. In such circumstance, the Court having jurisdiction alone can advert into all these aspects as a statutory requirement and, therefore, such cases are not arbitrable. As indicated above, the same is not the position in matters relating to the lease/tenancy which are not governed under the special statutes but under the TP Act.[Para No.17]

Under the grab of Public Interest Litigation a Third party can not file application u/s. 482 of Cr.P.C.

This Court in the above case laid down that it is for the parties in the criminal case to raise all the questions and challenge the proceedings initiated against them at appropriate time before the proper forum and not for third parties under the garb of Public Interest Litigants.[Para No.14]

    We are fully satisfied that respondent No.2 has no locus in the present case to file application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. asking the Court to expedite the hearing in criminal trial. We have already observed that all criminal trials where offences involved under the Prevention of Corruption Act have to be concluded at an early date and normally no exception can be taken to the order of the High Court directing the trial court to expedite the criminal trial but in the present case the fact is that proceedings have been initiated

by respondent No.2 who was not concerned with the proceedings in any manner and the respondent No.2 has no locus to file the application which was not clearly maintainable, we are of the view that the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 09.09.2020 cannot be sustained.[Para No.15]

Settlement deed executed before police under presure can not be used as admitted fact u/s.58 of Evidence Act

It is not the job of the police authorities to get the matter settled in their offices

    As it is undisputed fact that entire case of the plaintiff for advancing money to defendant was based upon Paper No. 13 Ka-1 executed before S.P. City, Aligarh, no other document was filed, nor the case was proved through oral testimony in regard to advancing of money to defendant. The oral testimony of PW-2 and PW-3 only prove the execution of Paper No. 13 Ka-1 before police authorities, apart from that plaintiff failed to disclose in his plaint the dates on which advance to the tune of Rs.14 lacs was made by him and also as to when Rs.2 lacs was returned by defendant. Plaintiff also did not bring on record his income tax return for the relevant years to prove whether he had disclosed the amount in his return.[Para No.27]

    Argument of learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted to the extent that Paper No. 13 Ka was proved by oral testimony of PWs and DWs and lower appellate court could not have decreed the suit against plaintiff on the ground that it was got executed under pressure.[Para No.28]

    It is plaintiff's specific case that Paper No. 13 Ka-1 was got executed before S.P. City, Aligarh on 25.05.2009. Plaintiff himself is a practicing lawyer at Aligarh and the two witnesses, Vinod Kumar Gautam (P.W.-2) and Arun Kumar Gautam (P.W.-3) are also practicing advocates in civil court in Aligarh, thus, it is an admitted case that document was executed before the police authorities, and neither of the police officers were examined as plaintiff witnesses to prove the execution of the said document. Burden of proving the document having been executed in the office of S.P. City, Aligarh was upon the plaintiff, as the defendant had categorically stated in his written statement as well as in cross-examination that the said document was got executed under duress and pressure.[Para No.29]

    It is strange to note that police station and office of district police officials are becoming center for mediation/ settlement of civil and commercial disputes. It is not the job of the police authorities to get the matter settled in their offices rather, making genuine efforts to curb and control crime in the district.[Para No.30]

    Once the plaintiff had relied upon the document to have been executed before police authorities, onus was upon him to prove that it was executed under free will, and the officer before whom the same was executed should have been produced as one of the witnesses.[Para No.31]

If a litigant wishes to make allegations against the advocate for negligence on his part, then the litigant should have a courage to join that advocate as a party and in his presence should make allegation against him

In the application, it is stated that she entrusted her matter to Mr. Vilas Mate, of Tumsar. She never met with Mr. Bhole, Advocate. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Bhole might, on instructions from Mr. Vilas Mate, have appeared before the Court below.[Para No.6]

    It is very easy for a litigant to make allegations against an advocate behind his back.

If the applicant wishes to make allegations against the advocate, the applicant should have a courage to join the advocate as a party and in his presence should make allegation against him. Here, the applicant wants to condemn the advocate behind his back. In my view, it is impermissible and unacceptable. Further, no steps are also being taken by the applicant against any advocate under the provision of the Advocates Act.[Para No.7]

    Thus, in my view, the reason as supplemented in the application is nothing but a attempt for claiming discretionary relief of condonation of delay from the Court. In my view, the applicant has not explained the delay, rather has not given plausible explanation for delay. Hence, the application is liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,000/- to be paid to the High Court Legal Services Sub Committee, Nagpur within three weeks from today[Para No.8]

Accused in cheque bounce case cannot take benefit if complainant has not shown the transaction in Income-Tax returns

Now it has been harped upon by the accused that the said transaction has not been accounted for. In other words, complainant has not shown the said transaction in her Income-Tax returns. Learned Advocate for the respondent as well as learned Trial Court have heavily relied on the decision in Sanjay Mishra (supra). However, it appears that the legal position that had developed thereafter was not pointed out to learned Trial Judge. In Bipin Thakkar (supra) entire legal position on this point has been discussed. In fact, Bipin Thakkar (supra) reiterates the law discussed on the point in Krishna P. Morajkar vs. Joe Ferrao and another [2013 ALL MR (Cri) 4129 : (2013) 5 AIR Bom R 294]. It is necessary to reproduce those observations from Krishna's case, which reads thus :-

"Further, it has been observed that there is no provision in Income-Tax Act, which makes an amount not shown in the income- tax returns unrecoverable. If some amounts are not accounted for, the person would be visited with the penalty or at times even prosecution under Income-Tax Act, but it does not mean that the borrower can refuse to pay the amount which he has borrowed simply, because there is some infraction of the provisions of the Income-Tax Act."[Para No.12]

    Thus, when in a subsequent pronouncements this Court has clarified the legal position that too, after taking note of subsequent pronouncement by Hon'ble Supreme Court,

then the later decision would prevail. It has been then observed in Bipin Thakkars' case that, "It is true that merely because amount advanced is not shown in Income-Tax return, in every case, one cannot jump to the conclusion that the presumption under Section 139 of said Act stands rebutted". We can consider the decision in the case of Assistant Director of Inspection vs. A. B. Shanthi, (2002) 6 SCC 259, wherein it has been held :-

"The object of introducing S. 269 is to ensure that a tax payer is not allowed to give false explanation for his unaccounted money, or if he has given some false entries in his accounts, he shall not escape by giving false explanation for the same. During search and seizure unaccounted money is unearthed and the tax payer would usually give the explanation that he had borrowed or received deposits from his relatives or friends sand it is easy for the so-called lender also to manipulate his records later to suit the plea of the tax-payer. The main object of S. 269-SS was to curb this menace."[Para No.13]

Investigation and filling of chargesheet under The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 should be done only by Special Police Officer empowered under Section 13 of the Act

Learned counsel also took my attention to Joseph v. State of Kerala [2011 (2) KHC 958]. In that decision, while dealing with Sections 3, 4, 5, 14 (ii) of the Act, it has been held that authorisation given by the Special Police Officer to his subordinate officer must mention the name of any of the persons to be arrested. It is also held that Special Police Officer cannot authorise investigation of the case to be conducted by any other officer. In paragraph No.4 of the said judgment, the ambit and scope of Section 13 has been dealt with, which is relevant in this context to be extracted and it reads as follows:

"4. There is also yet another aspect that is required to be looked into. Under S.13 of the Act, a Special Police Officer shall be appointed 'for dealing with the offences under this Act in that area'. 'Dealing with the case' means doing everything connected with the progress of the case. The Supreme Court in the decision referred supra considered that question and held that the expression would include detection, prevention and investigation of offences and other duties which have been specifically imposed on the Special Police Officer under the Act. It is seen from the records that investigation of the case was conducted by the Circle Inspector though, as authorised by the Special Police Officer and the role of the Special Police Officer was only to verify the investigation and submit final report. S.14(ii) of the Act does not empower the Special  

Police Officer to authorise investigation of the case to be conducted by any other officer. If that be so the investigation conducted by the officer other than the Special Police Officer is against the provisions of law."[Para No.8]

In an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is required to consider whether the civil dispute is tried to be given a colour of criminal dispute or not

Now so far as the reliance placed on the decision of this Court in the case of National Bank of Oman vs. Barakara Abdul Aziz (Supra) relied upon by the Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the complainant is concerned, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the said decision shall not be of any assistance to the complainant.

It cannot be disputed that while holding the inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate is required to take a broad view and a prima facie case. However, even while conducting/holding an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is required to consider whether even a prima facie case is made out or not and whether the criminal proceedings initiated are an abuse of process of law or the Court or not and/or whether the dispute is purely of a civil nature or not and/or whether the civil dispute is tried to be given a colour of criminal dispute or not. As observed hereinabove, the dispute between the parties can be said to be purely of a civil nature. Therefore, this is a fit case to quash and set aside the impugned criminal proceedings. [Para No.6.5]

Mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law

It is also now a well-settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law.

Wile exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not. The court will not apply the beneficent provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner. When the provisions are meant to apply and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and circumstances of a case, in our opinion, there is no reason as to why the court will refuse to apply the same only because a wrong provision has been mentioned. In a case of this nature, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se may not be applicable, but, as indicated hereinbefore, the principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 thereof.[Para No.14]

Magistrate; after taking cognizance, cannot issue, at the first instance, non bailable arrest warrant against accused who has obtained anticipatory bail

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners were granted anticipatory bail by this Court in the FIR registered against them bearing No.3/2003 at Police Station Khetri, District Jhunjhunu under Section(s) 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 406 & 120-B IPC. The police submitted a Final Report whereafter protest petition was filed, which was dismissed.

    Against the dismissal order of the protest petition, a revision petition was filed, which was allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khetri and the matter was remanded back to the Court to pass a fresh order on 18.7.2018, whereafter the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on 11.1.2019 and summoned the petitioners through arrest warrants. The said order of remand was challenged by the petitioners before the High Court and the High Court had stayed the said proceedings. Taking into consideration the order of taking cognizance, the petition was declared infructuous.[Para No.1]

    Learned Magistrate thereafter again issued arrest warrants.[Para No.2]

......

    For the aforesaid backdrop, this Court notices that it is a case where on remand from the District Judge, the Court has taken cognizance of the offences relating to allegations under Sections 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 406 & 120-B IPC. The High Court vide its order dated 29.4.2003 had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioners with the condition that in the event of arresting the petitioners, they shall be released on bail.

    

    Keeping in view the conditions laid down in Sushila Agarwal & Others (supra), this Court is of the firm view that

the action of the learned Magistrate from the date, it has taken cognizance and upto passing of the impugned order dated 3.9.2020 has acted in clear violation of the orders passed by the High Court after having granted anticipatory bail. There was no occasion for the learned Magistrate to have issued the arrest warrants and such course or power was not available with it in spite of having been given to it.

Absence of proof of motive creates a doubt regarding the mens rea entitling the accused for an acquittal

Mens rea of the accused has much relevance in a case when the benefit under Section 84 IPC has been pleaded by an accused. So when the prosecution in this case failed to prove any motive behind the incident it would also raise a reasonable doubt of mens rea in doing the act. So as per the proposition of law laid down above, it would be a fact which creates a reasonable doubt entitling the accused to get the benefit of the exception.

In other words absence of proof of motive from the side of the prosecution creates a doubt in the mind of the court regarding the mens rea entitling the accused for an acquittal.[Para No.44]

    Though the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that medical evidence adduced from the side of the prosecution would not prove the unsoundness of mind at the time of the commission of the offence even if accepted the attending circumstances brought out during the oral evidence of the witnesses coupled with the medical evidence would create a reasonable suspicion about the soundness of the mind of the accused at the time of commission of the act. That also would enable the accused for benefit of doubt entitling for an acquittal on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution is not discharged.[Para No.45]

...............

In investigation police should consider the defence put forth by the accused which if investigated fairly, may exonerate him

In Ankush Maruti Shinde The Supreme Court expressed its displeasure against the police for the manner in which it had investigated an offence in which several people were murdered and a woman raped in which, the accused persons, who were members of a nomadic tribe were falsely implicated while, the actual perpetrators of the crime who were identified by the witness's from the register at the police station, where never proceeded or investigated into. Underscoring the importance of a fair investigation, The Supreme Court held "It has to be uppermost kept in mind that impartial and truthful investigation is imperative. It is judiciously acknowledged that fair trial includes fair investigation as envisaged by Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The role of the police is to be one for protection of life, liberty and property of citizens, that investigation of offences being one of its foremost duties. That the aim of investigation is ultimately to search for truth and to bring the offender to book". In the same judgment, The Supreme Court, relying upon an earlier judgment passed in V.K. Sasikala Vs. State - (2012) 9 SCC 771, Highlighted the importance of the police in examining the documents that maybe in support of the accused and held in the following words "As observed by this Court in V.K. Sasikala v. State [V.K. Sasikala v. State, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1010] , though it is only such reports which support the prosecution case that are required to be forwarded to the Court under Section 173(5), in every situation where some of the seized papers and the documents do not support the prosecution case and, on the contrary, support the accused, a duty is cast on the investigating officer to evaluate the two sets of documents and materials collected and, if required, to exonerate the accused at that stage itself"[Para No.21]

    In Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat, The Supreme Court examined a case arising from a fight between two groups in which three people died. The police are alleged to have examined the case only from the standpoint of one, completely ignoring the defence of the other. Emphasising on the importance of a fair investigation, the Supreme Court held "The investigation into a criminal offence must be free from objectionable features or infirmities which may legitimately lead to a grievance on the part of the accused that investigation was unfair and carried out with an ulterior motive. It is also the duty of the investigating officer to conduct the investigation avoiding any kind of mischief and harassment to any of the accused. The investigating officer should be fair and conscious so as to rule out any possibility of fabrication of evidence and his impartial conduct must dispel any suspicion as to its genuineness. The investigating officer "is not merely to bolster up a prosecution case with such evidence as may enable the court to record a conviction but to bring out the real unvarnished truth". (Vide R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239] , Jamuna Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [(1974) 3 SCC 774 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 250 : AIR 1974 SC 1822] , SCC at p. 780, para 11 and Mahmood v. State of U.P. [(1976) 1 SCC 542 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 72 : AIR 1976 SC 69] )". Further, in the same judgement Supreme Court held "Not only fair trial but fair investigation is also part of constitutional rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, investigation must be fair, transparent and judicious as it is the minimum requirement of rule of law. The investigating agency cannot be permitted to conduct an investigation in a tainted and biased manner. Where non-interference of the court would ultimately result in failure of justice, the court must interfere. In such a situation, it may be in the interest of justice that independent agency chosen by the High Court makes a fresh investigation"[Para No.22]

    Thus, fair investigation by the police is an imperative facet inhering in Article 21. It is not an option but a constitutional mandate on the police that when it investigates, it must be done, not from the standpoint of the prosecution alone, but also from the point of view of the accused. It has to consider the defence put forth by the accused which if investigated fairly, may exonerate him. The purpose of investigation is not to secure a conviction of the accused but to unearth the truth relating to the commission of an offence. A partisan investigation is a defective investigation which puts a question mark on the sanctity of the proceedings against the accused. If after taking the defence of the accused into consideration the police is of the view that the accused is not the person who committed the offence, in such a situation he is to be exonerated and the case against him, closed. In the present case, the investigation was initially biased and one-sided. There was even reluctance on the part of the police to accept documents from the accused. Even after the police had received the prurient photographs of the deceased, it never carried out any investigation to examine the motive of the deceased to commit suicide and whether the reason put forth by the Petitioner was plausible. The police have merely taken the material given by the Petitioner and made the same a part of the chargesheet without conducting any investigation into the defence of the Petitioner. The police have merely recorded the statement of the immediate relations of the deceased and filed the chargesheet against the Petitioner. No investigation was conducted to a certain the veracity of the allegations against the Petitioner.[Para No.23]

Order of process issue u/s.204 of Cr.P.C.; passed summarily and without discussing facts, evidence, law and exact overt act, is not proper legal judicial order

As held by the Courts as above, the passing of order of summoning any person as accused is a very important matter, which initiates criminal proceeding against him. Such orders cannot be passed summarily or without applying judicial mind.[Para No.13]

    In light of this legal position I have gone through the impugned order. A perusal of this order indicates that neither any discussion of evidence was made by learned Magistrate, nor was it considered as to which accused had allegedly committed what overt act. The five accused persons of complaint were summoned for offences mentioned in it. Impugned order clearly lacks the reflection of application of judicial discretion or mind.

Nothing is there which may show that learned Magistrate, before passing of the order under challenge had considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence or the law. Therefore it appears that, in fact, no judicial mind was applied before the passing of impugned order of summoning. Such order cannot be accepted as a proper legal judicial order passed after following due procedure of law. Therefore it is liable to be quashed.[Para No.14]

Mesne profits and interest thereon received under the direction of the Civil Court is revenue receipt and is liable to tax u/s. 23(1) of the Income Tax Act

The real issue that needs consideration in the present appeal is whether the mesne profits, and interest on mesne profits, received by the appellant constituted revenue receipt, or capital receipt, in the hands of the appellant/assessee, in the facts and circumstances of the case.[Para No.40]

    Having heard the submissions of learned counsels for the parties and having given our due consideration to them in the light of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsels,

we are of the view that the mesne profits, and interest on mesne profits, received by the appellant in pursuance of the court decree, in the facts of the present case, constitute revenue receipt.[Para No.41]

    When we apply the said test to the facts of the present case, the only conclusion that we can draw is that the receipt of mesne profits and interest thereon by the appellant/assessee, was a revenue receipt. The capital asset of the appellant i.e. the property in question was earning revenue for the appellant by way of rent till so long as the lease subsisted. After the termination of the lease, the erstwhile tenant continued to occupy the premises unauthorisedly. It is in lieu of the rent which the appellant would have otherwise derived from the tenant, that the mesne profits and interest thereon have been awarded. So far as the capital asset of the assesse is concerned, the same has remained intact. It is not the appellants case that there was any damage to the property/ capital asset inasmuch, as, the building structure was damaged by the bank, and that damages have been awarded by the Court on account of such physical damage. Even the title of the appellant in respect of the capital asset remained intact. Had it been a case where the capital asset would have been subjected to physical damage, or of diminution of the title to the capital asset, and damages would have been awarded under the head, there would have been merit in the appellant's claim that damages received for harm and injury to the capital asset, or on account of its diminution, would be a capital receipt.[Para No.46]

At the time of taking cognizance on chargesheet, Magistrate is not supposed to act as a Post Office

At the time of consideration of charge Magistrate can take into consideration certain facts and documents pointed out and/or submitted by or on behalf of accused 

Filing of Civil Suit for redressal of damages does not bar a person from initiating a criminal case involving ingredients of criminal offence entitling plaintiff/complainant to initiate criminal case against the offender

    It is settled that at the time of taking cognizance of offence, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to find out as to whether trial is clearly going to culminate into conviction of accused or not, but the Magistrate has only to see whether there is prima-facie evidence on record so as to construe that there is possibility of commission of offence by the accused and even if there is evidence raising suspicion of commission of offence by accused the cognizance can be taken by the Magistrate and thereafter the accused has a right to put his version before the Court on the basis of evidence on record at the time of framing of Charge.[Para No.15]

    Parameters to be taken into consideration by the Court at the time of framing of charge are altogether different than that to be taken into consideration at the time of taking cognizance. At the time of taking of cognizance, Magistrate has to look into that material only which is placed before him by the Prosecution/Investigating Agency, but at the time of consideration of charge Magistrate can take into consideration certain facts and documents pointed out and/or submitted by or on behalf of accused and thereafter he can take a decision as to whether there is sufficient material for framing of charge or not. Recently this Court in case Siemens Enterprise Communications Pvt.. Ltd. now known as Progility Technologies Pvt. Ltd. vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in 2019 (3) Shim. LC 1691, on the basis of ratio of law propounded by the Apex Court in its various pronouncements, has reiterated the power of the Magistrate as well as parameters to be taken into consideration at the time of framing of charge. It is also settled that at the time of undertaking such exercise at the time of framing of charge the Magistrate is not supposed to conduct a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge and not to appreciate evidence as warranted at the stage of conclusion of trial, but he has power to evaluate material and the documents on record alongwith material being referred by the accused if the said parameter confirms to the parameters laid down by the Apex Court reiterated in Siemens' case supra. Whereas at the stage of taking cognizance, as already stated supra, on consideration of material placed before Magistrate by prosecution/investigating agency, even if there is evidence raising suspicion of commission of offence by accused the cognizance can be taken.[Para No.16]

    No doubt, the evidence or material placed before the Magistrate, at the time of taking cognizance, is not to be evaluated on merit, but definitely it is duty of the Court to see as to whether some evidence is available on record or not.

In case, there is no evidence on record to indicate commission of alleged offence(s), the Magistrate is not supposed to act as a Post Office, but is expected to apply his judicial mind according to facts and circumstances of the case for accepting or rejecting the challan/report filed before him under Section 173 Cr.P.C.[Para No.17]

Wife can proceed simultaneously under both the provisions of Sec.125 of CrPC and Sec.12 of The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act

As far as other contention raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the orders/judgment passed by learned Courts below is not sustainable in view of the fact that the petitioner was also receiving Rs.3,500/­ per month under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code Cr.P.C., is concerned,

the said plea of learned Counsel for the petitioner is also liable to be rejected. The provisions of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are distinct and different. Law does not prohibits the wife to proceed under both of the said statutory provisions simultaneously or Otherwise.[Para No.11]

Bail can not be denied to chargesheeted accused on the ground of abscondence of other accused

It is pertinent to note that the other ground raised by the prosecution is that the co­accused, who is relative of the present applicant, is absconding and, therefore, present petitioner may not be enlarged on bail.

Now, it is well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that even for securing presence or for getting whereabouts of the co­accused, no police custody remand could be granted. The same principle will apply in the case where bail is sought by the accused and the charge sheet is already filed against him/her. If there is laxity or inability of the prosecution to arrest the co­accused, on that ground the other accused against whom investigation is over and charge sheet is filed cannot be denied the right of getting bail in a given case.[Para No.7]

Mere existence of motive to commit an offence by itself cannot give rise to an inference of guilt nor can it form the basis for conviction

Needless to say motive is that which impels a person to do a particular act. There can be no action without a motive. Motive may create a very strong suspicion but it cannot take the place of proof. Mere possibility of existence of motive cannot make the accused guilty, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab. Where the prosecution case depends on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes significance and goes a long way to prove the case of the prosecution as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shivaji vs. State[Para No.36]

   Mere existence of motive by itself is not an incriminating circumstance and it cannot give rise to an inference of guilt nor can it form the basis for conviction. Motive for the crime, even if adequate, cannot by itself sustain a criminal charge. In the case in hand, we have discussed elaborately how the prosecution is found wanting in establishing the "last seen" theory. Therefore, practically, there is no evidence to establish any of the circumstances, which in such type of cases, need to be established by the prosecution and even if we assume for the sake of argument that the accused was harboring a motive to commit the murder of the deceased, that in itself, for want of other positive evidence, will not sail the prosecution through.[Para No.37]

Relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted

Pleadings and particulars are necessary to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Therefore, the pleadings are more of help to the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue.

It is a settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted". A decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide: M/s. Trojan & Co. v. RM N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235; State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., AIR  2010 SC 1299; and Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P. Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127).[Para No.7]

There is no limitation of period for invoking High Court's inherent powers u/s.482 Cr.P.C.

If evidence is relevant, it is admissible irrespective of how it is obtained

The Investigating Agency has no power to appreciate the evidence

    Regarding limitation, although delay is duly explained in the petition, however, there is no applicability of Limitation Act on Section 482 Cr.P.C. being the inherent powers of this Court. The said section is starting itself with a non-obstante clause (Notwithstanding) therefore, this Court has power to exercise inherent powers where there is miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of law. Non-applicability of Limitation Act and non- providing of limitation period in Cr.P.C. with regard to Section 482 Cr.P.C., the intention of the legislature was not to restrict this Court to use these powers in appropriate cases. Thus, raising the issue of limitation period about Section 482 Cr.P.C. is itself contrary to the intention of legislature and the very section itself. In this regard, judgments relied upon by the respondent no.2 (complainant) are not applicable, as facts and circumstances of those cases are different from the case in hand.[Para No.49

    As far as the issue of source of document is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts including the case of Pushpadevi M. Jatia vs. M.L. Wadhavan & Ors.: (1987) 3 SCC 367 relied upon by respondent no.2 (complainant) held that the source of the evidence is not material, as long as it is admissible under the law, the same may be considered. If evidence is relevant, it is admissible irrespective of how it is obtained.[Para No.50]

.......

The proof of demand is an indispensable essentiality to prove the offence under The Prevention of Corruption Act

In the light of the serious discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution, the accused is entitled for benefit of doubt. The demand of bribe is not established by clinching evidence. Acceptance of bribe suffers from serious doubt. In Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam, it was held that Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cannot aford to rests its case in the realm "may be" true but has to upgrade it in the domain of "may be", in order to steer clear of any possible surmise or conjuncture. Court must ensure that miscarriage of justice are avoided and if in the facts and circumstances, two views are possible then, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. Applying the legal principle as above, the material on record, leave note manner of doubt that the prosecution in the present case, has failed to prove unequivocally the demand of illegal gratification and even its acceptance. In the case of P.Satyanarayna Murthy Vs. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. It was held that the proof of demand of illegal gratification is gravamen of offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the P.C. Act and in the absence thereof mistakenly the charge therefore, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would not be sufficient to prove home the charge under these sections of the Act.

As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder. In the case of B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh. It was held that the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act can be drawn on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any oficial act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. In catena of decisions, the Apex Court has held that mere possession of recovery of currency note from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Section 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the P.C. Act. It has been propounded that in absence of proof of demand of any illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand has been held to be an indispensable essentiality to prove the offence. In the present case, the demand as well as acceptance is under shadow of doubt and has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. 31 Considering the discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, I find that the evidence adduced against the accused by prosecution suffers from doubt. In the circumstances, the evidence relating to demand and acceptance cannot be believed. The accused is entitled for benefit of doubt and deserves to be acquitted.[Para No.30]

Bail should be granted or refused based on the probability of attendance of the party to take his trial

By now it is well settled that gravity alone cannot be a decisive ground to deny bail, rather competing factors are required to be balanced by the court while exercising its discretion. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Sanjay Chandra versus Central Bureau of Investigation (2012)1 Supreme Court Cases 49; has been held as under:­ "The object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The Courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. Detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In India , it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the propose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson."[Para No.5]

    Needless to say object of the bail is to secure the attendance of the accused in the trial and the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial. Otherwise also, normal rule is of bail and not jail. Apart from above, Court has to keep in mind nature of accusations, nature of evidence in support thereof, severity of the punishment, which conviction will entail, character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused involved in that crime.[Para No.6]

While releasing accused on default bail u/s.167(2) of Cr.P.C. the court can not impose any condition of depositing cash amount or to report before police station daily

Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and considering the scheme and the object and purpose of default bail/statutory bail, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in imposing condition that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.8,00,000/­ while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail. It appears that the High Court has imposed such a condition taking into consideration the fact that earlier at the time of hearing of the regular bail application, before the learned Magistrate, the wife of the appellant filed an affidavit agreeing to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­. However, as observed by this Court in catena of decisions and more particularly in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), where the investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60 th or 90th day, accused gets an “indefeasible right” to default bail, and the accused becomes entitled to default bail once the accused applies for default bail and furnish bail. Therefore, the only requirement for getting the default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused is in jail for more than 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, and within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, the investigation is not completed and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail. No other condition of deposit of the alleged amount involved can be imposed. Imposing such condition while releasing the accused on default bail/statutory bail would frustrate the very object and purpose of default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. As observed by this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) and in other decisions, the accused is entitled to default bail/statutory bail, subject to the eventuality occurring in Section 167, Cr.P.C., namely, investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60 th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail.[Para No.9]

    As observed hereinabove and even from the impugned orders passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail has imposed the condition to deposit Rs.8,00,000/­ taking into consideration that earlier before the learned Magistrate and while considering the regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C., the wife of the accused filed an affidavit to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­. That cannot be a ground to impose the condition to deposit the amount involved, while granting default bail/statutory bail.[Para No.9.1]

    The circumstances while considering the regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C. are different, while considering the application for default bail/statutory bail. Under the circumstances, the condition imposed by the High Court to deposit Rs.8,00,000/­, while releasing the appellant on default bail/ statutory bail is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside.[Para No.9.2]

Residence Order passed under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act does not impose any embargo for filing or continuing civil suit seeking permanent injuction against daughter-in-law

From the above discussions, we arrive at following conclusions:-

(i) The pendency of proceedings under Act, 2005 or any order interim or final passed under D.V. Act under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of order interim or final passed in proceedings under D.V. Act, 2005.

(ii) The judgment or order of criminal court granting an interim or final relief under Section 19 of D.V. Act, 2005 are relevant within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and can be referred to and looked into by the civil court.

(iii) A civil court is to determine the issues in civil proceedings on the basis of evidence, which has been led by the parties before the civil court.

(iv) In the facts of the present case, suit filed in civil court for mandatory and permanent injunction was fully maintainable and the issues raised by the appellant as well as by the defendant claiming a right under Section 19 were to be addressed and decided on the basis of evidence, which is led by the parties in the suit.[Para No.157]