Judicial discretion cannot be so liberally exercised as to condone the delay where no cause is made out or the cause ascribed is unworthy of acceptance

The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one

    A profitable reference in this context can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and others, 2010(8) Supreme Court Cases 685, wherein after adverting to a number of precedents, including the judgment in the case of Perumon Bhagwathy Devaswom (supra), the Supreme Court cautioned against construing the provisions of the Order XXII of the Code and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in such a manner as to render them redundant and inoperative.[Para No.17]

    The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 32 to 35 and 38 are instructive. They read asunder:

“32. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly.

    Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to the provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law.

34. Liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the Court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect “sufficient cause” as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition 1997).

35. The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word “sufficient” means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated.

36…………………………………………………………….

37…………………………………………………………….

38. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this,the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The 

statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications.”[Para No.18]

If a litigant wishes to make allegations against the advocate for negligence on his part, then the litigant should have a courage to join that advocate as a party and in his presence should make allegation against him

In the application, it is stated that she entrusted her matter to Mr. Vilas Mate, of Tumsar. She never met with Mr. Bhole, Advocate. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Bhole might, on instructions from Mr. Vilas Mate, have appeared before the Court below.[Para No.6]

    It is very easy for a litigant to make allegations against an advocate behind his back.

If the applicant wishes to make allegations against the advocate, the applicant should have a courage to join the advocate as a party and in his presence should make allegation against him. Here, the applicant wants to condemn the advocate behind his back. In my view, it is impermissible and unacceptable. Further, no steps are also being taken by the applicant against any advocate under the provision of the Advocates Act.[Para No.7]

    Thus, in my view, the reason as supplemented in the application is nothing but a attempt for claiming discretionary relief of condonation of delay from the Court. In my view, the applicant has not explained the delay, rather has not given plausible explanation for delay. Hence, the application is liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,000/- to be paid to the High Court Legal Services Sub Committee, Nagpur within three weeks from today[Para No.8]

Delay in filing written statement can not be condoned if defendant found at laxity or gross negligence in filing the same

The Court below was expected to consider the application at Exhibit-32 on the basis of its contents, in the backdrop of the aforesaid facts indicating deliberate delay on the part of the respondent and by applying the position of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in the context of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, particularly pertaining to the responsibility on the part of the defendant to act in a diligent manner and in any case to explain before the Court with cogent reasons for delay in filing the written statement. A perusal of the impugned order shows that no such effort was made by the Court below and in a cryptic and casual manner the application at Exhibit- 32 stood allowed.[Para No.13]

    The learned counsel for the petitioners is justified in relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Parasmal Daulatram Jain Vs. Rameshwar Rathanlal Karwa (supra), wherein this Court has reiterated the position of law concerning the approach to be adopted by the Courts while considering permission to the defendant to file written statement beyond the stipulated period of time. This Court placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein it has been categorically stated that even if the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in this regard can be said to be directory and not mandatory, the Courts cannot permit laxity or gross negligence on the part of the defendant to be condoned while granting permission to file written statement. In the facts of the present case, this Court is of the opinion that if the impugned order passed by the Court below is upheld, it would amount to giving premium to the respondent, not only for laxity and gross negligence, but to tactics adopted by her to somehow delay the proceedings in the suit for eviction filed by the petitioners. Although, it is expected that Courts decide disputes between parties by giving opportunity to the contesting party to place their respective versions on merits, there are situations where the Courts ought not to show misplaced indulgence to litigants like the respondent herein by adopting a liberal approach.[Para No.14]