After lapse of previous rent agreement if fresh rent agreement is not created, then the landlord can recover last payable rent but not the enhanced rent

The finding by both the learned Courts below on issue no.3 has been taken up for examination. In this regard, at the outset it must be seen that how far the Agreement for House Rent dated 29.02.2000 (Ext.3, also marked as Ext.D) can be read to determine the quantum of monthly rent for which the petitioner and proforma respondent no.2 had committed default, if there be any. In this regard, as per the provisions of Section 17(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 it is provided that leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent is required to be compulsorily registered. The consequences of non registration is prescribed in Section 49(c) of the said Act, which provides that no document required by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered. However, as per the proviso appended thereto, such document may be received as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. Therefore, when both the Courts below were examining the issue of rent payable after 01.03.2003, there was no written agreement in existence commencing from 01.03.2003. However, the rent payable during the tenure of the agreement was the purpose of agreement, as such, for the purpose of the quantum of the

rent payable for the period commencing from 01.03.2003 onwards, the said rent agreement (Ext.3, also exhibited as Ext.D) cannot be read in evidence. After 28.02.2003, the petitioner and respondent no.2 were holding the status of statutory tenant. In view of the discussions above, the evidence to the effect that as per the terms of Ext.3/Ext.D, the rent last payable under the said agreement was Rs.2,640/- per month.[Para No.22]

Daughter-in-law has no right of residence in the self-acquired property of mother-in-law or father-in-law

Daughter in law threatening her in laws to dis-possess from their own property - mother in law filed suit against her alongwith an application for interim injunction u/s. 151 and Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 - plaintiff-mother in law contended that she is the owner of the suit property on the strength of registered sale deed - trial court refused to grant interim injunction observing that the house is a shared house under the Domestic Violence Act and the daughter in law cannot be forcibly evicted from the same as her belongings are still lying there - appeal by district court allowed - daughter in law prefered revision against order passed in appeal - revision dismissed.

    In view of Krishan Kumar vs Navneet's case (supra) and Varinder Kaur vs Jitender Kumar's case (supra), the parents-in-law of the self-acquired property are the real owners and the daughter-in-law has no right to claim it as shared house and has no right of residence in the self-acquired property of parents-in-law. The daughter-in-law cannot be allowed to live in the house of parents-in-law against their wishes.

    While relying upon S.R. Batra and another vs Smt. Taruna Batra, 2007(1) RCR (Criminal) 403 in Suman vs Tulsi Ram 2015(1) RCR (Civil) 304, it was held that daughter-in-law does not have any right of protection under Section 17 of the Act for the purpose of living in the house belonging to parents-in-law which is exclusively owned by them.

No relief can be granted to the tenant on the ground of comparative hardship if he has never made any effort for searching alternative accomodation

So far as comparative hardship is concerned, it is undisputed fact that the petitioner has never attempted to search alternative space for shifting his business and law is very well settled on this point. The Apex Court as well as this Court has repeatedly held that it is necessarily required on the part of tenant to make full endeavour to search alternative accomodation to prove his comparative hardship after receiving copy of release application. In the matter of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra), the Court has clearly held that it is required on the part of tenant to make effort for searching alternative accomodation. Again in the matter of Salim Khan (supra), this Court, relying upon the judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court, was of the view that it is required on the part of petitioner to search accomodation after filing the release application and in the present case there is no dispute that the petitioner had never made any effort to search alternative accomodation. Not only this, the Court has also considered the Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 and considering the another judgment of Ganga Devi (supra), Court has taken the view that Rule 16 of Rules, 1972 would not come in the rescue of petitioner, in case, petitioner-tenant has not made any effort to search another accomodation. Here in the present case, there is no dispute on the point that petitioner has not made any effort to search alternative accomodation.

    In the matter of Sarju Prasad (supra), this Court has again taken the same view and held that in case effort was not made for alternative accomodation, this would be sufficient to tilt the balance of comparative hardship against the tenant. This view was again repeated by this Court in the case of Bachchu Lal (supra) and held that to prove the comparative hardship, it is necessarily required to make effort to search alternative accomodation, which is absolutely missing in the present case.

    Therefore, in light of fact that petitioner has never made any effort for searching alternative accomodation coupled with law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court, no relief can be granted to the petitioner on the ground of comparative hardship.

Even If landlord has multiple premises available with him still the tenant cannot dictate to him which of the premises he may seek to get vacated

Tenant can be evicted for bona fide requirement of married daughter of landlord even if such daughter or her husband is having resources to purchase other premisses

    In another decision rendered by a single Judge of our High Court in Vinod Gupta vs. Kailash Aggarwal & Ors. where the bona- fidé requirement of a married daughter was canvassed, the single Judge relying upon the decision in Sunder Singh Talwar (supra) has also referred to a 2014 decision as follows :

"14. Further in Rajender Prasad Gupta V. Rajeev Gagerna 2014 (114) DRJ 182, the Court held as follows :
"5. Having considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that the Trial Court has taken into consideration each of the contentions raised in the leave-to-defend and found them to be not triable issues. The reasons for and conclusion arrived at cannot be faulted. Furthermore, simply because the daughter of a marriageable age and allegedly likely to marry would not necessary cut her ties from her maternal family nor would the requirement for her accommodation in her father's house be lessened. Indeed, in the present times a daughter who is married-out, may like to retain her accommodation in her father's house which forms an emotional anchor and a place for refuge for all times. In times of an unfortunate marital discord such need becomes more acute should there be such a need.
    Conversely her family also would want to retain a room so as to re-assure her of a continued place of residence in her paternal home. A married daughter's ties with her paternal family do not end upon her marriage. For a married daughter her parents' home is always a refuge; an abode of reassurance and an abiding source of emotional strength and happiness. In the present case the daughter is a practicing advocate, i.e. a qualified professional, the need is all the more acute and bona fide. This Court finds, as did the Trial Court did, that no triable issues were raised in the leave-to- defend. Therefore, there was no need to grant leave or set the matter for trial. The reasons and the conclusion arrived at in the impugned order are correct and call for no interference." 

"15. Thus the law discussed above does not leave any room for further discussion on this topic. Admittedly the law as it stands, the daughters share equal rights in their parental properties as a son does, hence saying a married daughter severe (sic) all her relations with her father's family and would never be considered dependent upon the family's property, residential or commercial, that her parents own, would not be correct. Hence no fault can be found in impugned order even on this score."

(emphasis supplied) The single Judge thereby upheld the denial of leave-to-defend to the tenant.[Para No.16]

    While the ARC has clearly erred in holding that the requirement of a married daughter can never be considered while deciding the bona-fidé requirement of a landlord under section 14(1)(e) since a married daughter does not remain a member of the family, another question arises in the present case, and that is : whether in assessing the availability of suitable, alternate accommodation for the use of a married daughter, it is necessary to first assess the availability of such accommodation in the hands of the husband ; or is it permissible to assess the availability of such accommodation in the hands of the maternal family of the married daughter. In the opinion of this court, this question must be answered from the perspective of the eviction petitioner who seeks recovery of possession for the bona fidé requirement of a dependent family member. Accordingly, the availability of suitable, alternate accommodation is to be seen in the hands of the person filing the eviction petition, in this case the mother/landlady; and it is not relevant whether other relatives of the dependant family member have any alternate accommodation available. In this case, it is therefore not relevant whether the petitioner's sons-in-law have alternate accommodation or not.[Para No.17]

Question of title of the property is not germane for decision of the eviction suit

It may be pointed out that it is well settled law that the question of title of the property is not germane for decision of the eviction suit. In a case where a plaintiff institutes a suit for eviction of his tenant based on the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the scope of the suit is very much limited in which a question of title cannot be gone into because the suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed even if he succeeds in proving his title but fails to establish the privity of contract of tenancy.

In a suit for eviction based on such relationship the Court has only to decide whether the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff or not, though the question of title is disputed, may incidentally be gone into, in connection with the primary question for determining the main question about the India Automobiles & Co. [1990 (4) SCC 286 at para 21] this Court had an occasion to deal with similar controversy. In the said decision this Court observed that in a suit for eviction between the landlord and tenant, the Court will take only a prime facie decision on the collateral issue as to whether the applicant was landlord. If the Court finds existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties it will have to pass a decree in accordance with law. It has been further observed that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has prima facie right to receive the rent of the property in question. In order to decide whether denial of landlord's title by the tenant is bonafide the Court may have to go into tenant contention on the issue out the Court is not to decide the question of title finally as the Court has to see whether the tenant's denial of title of the landlord is bonafide in the circumstances of the case.[Para No.9]

Daughter-in-law is merely a licensee in house owned by in-laws

Necessary party to suit - Sec. 2 (s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act - Scope of definition of Shared Houshold - House property is exclusively own by father-in-law - After marriage daughter-in-law started to live in that house with her husband - Daughter-in-law started harassing her in-laws - father-in-law asked his son to vacate the house - Son alongwith wife left the house - After sometime daughter-in-law came bake and forcibly entered in that house and refused to vacate the house - Father-in-law filed a suit for eviction against his daughter in law without impleading his son as defendant.

• Is the son necessary party to eviction suit filed against daughter-in-law?

• Does the property owned by in-laws; in which their son was permitted to live with his wife, falls under the definition of Shared Household as defined u/s.2(s) of PWDV Act?

Held:

In-laws can evict Daughter-in-law from their house without seeking decree of eviction against their son. House exclusively owned by in-laws is not Shared Houshold under PWDV Act. Daughter-in-law is merely a licensee.

Photocopy of documents can not be impounded by civil court

Suit for eviction of tenant - tenant in his evidence produced photocopy of rent agreement - Landlord denied the same and objected - notice to produce the document was issued, but, landlord denied the very existence of rent agreement - document is not exhibited - Appellate court  impounded the photocopy of agreement to the payment of requisite stamp duty and penalty thereon and further ordered that after payment of the requisite stamp duty and penalty on the said document it be exhibited for the collateral purpose.

   Section 2(l) of the said Act, defines "instrument" and it reads as follows :

"instrument" includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded, but does not include a bill of exchange, cheque, promissory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of insurance, transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt;"

   A perusal of the said definition makes it clear that an "instrument" under the said Act is a document by which any right or liability is created or extinguished. Such a document would necessarily be the original of the said document and in this context, when Section 32(A) of the said Act is perused, it refers to "instrument" of conveyance, exchange, gift, etc. In a situation, where there is a short fall in payment of stamp duty, the Collector of the District has to give the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard and then determine the difference of amount of duty payable along with penalty and on payment of such amounts, "instrument" received shall be returned to the officer or the person concerned.