Mere existence of motive to commit an offence by itself cannot give rise to an inference of guilt nor can it form the basis for conviction

Needless to say motive is that which impels a person to do a particular act. There can be no action without a motive. Motive may create a very strong suspicion but it cannot take the place of proof. Mere possibility of existence of motive cannot make the accused guilty, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab. Where the prosecution case depends on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes significance and goes a long way to prove the case of the prosecution as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shivaji vs. State[Para No.36]

   Mere existence of motive by itself is not an incriminating circumstance and it cannot give rise to an inference of guilt nor can it form the basis for conviction. Motive for the crime, even if adequate, cannot by itself sustain a criminal charge. In the case in hand, we have discussed elaborately how the prosecution is found wanting in establishing the "last seen" theory. Therefore, practically, there is no evidence to establish any of the circumstances, which in such type of cases, need to be established by the prosecution and even if we assume for the sake of argument that the accused was harboring a motive to commit the murder of the deceased, that in itself, for want of other positive evidence, will not sail the prosecution through.[Para No.37]

Intention of accused can be gathered from the fact whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot

The conspectus of the decisions can summarised thus:

The offence to fall within Exception 4 of section 300 of The Indian Penal Code 1860 following ingredients must be fulfilled Viz.(i) that the act was committed without premeditation; ( ii) that there was a sudden fight; (iii) the act must be in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel; and (iv) the offender should not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.[Para No.22]

    The intention to cause death as contemplated by thirdly of Section 300 of The Indian Penal Code 1860 can be gathered from following factors:

(i) nature of the weapon used;

(ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot;

(iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body;

(iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury;

(v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight;

(vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation;

(vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger;

(viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation;

(ix) whether it was in the heat of passion;

(x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner;

(xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.[Para No.23]

Insurance company is not liable to pay compensation for death of third party if vehicle is used as a weapon to murder by crushing down

Whether the brutal killing of two persons by the 7 th Respondent/Driver (who has been found guilty of murder under Section 302 IPC and has been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Trial Court) using the Truck as a weapon and crushing them down, could be treated as an 'accident' or as 'out of the use of a motor vehicle' so as to award compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased, on the strength of a policy issued by the Appellant-Insurer? The finding of the Tribunal that the said incident is an accident and the Appellant/Insurer is liable to pay the compensation, is put to challenge in these appeals.[Para No.1]

    Coming to the scope for payment of compensation under the MV Act and the coverage of third party risk, Chapter XI has been provided for insurance of the motor vehicles against the third party risk. Section 146 speaks about the necessity for insurance against third party risk to the effect that no person shall use, except as a passenger, or cause or allow any other person to use, a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of the said Chapter. The requirements of policy and limits of liability have been mentioned under Section 147 of the MV Act; whereas the duty of the insurers to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risk has been dealt with under Section 149 of the MV Act.[Para No.11]

    As mentioned already, on occurrence of an accident involving use of a motor vehicle, compensation can be claimed either under Section 163A of the MV Act on the basis of a structured formula (where it is not necessary for the Claimants to plead or prove negligence on the part of the Driver or the Owner) or under Section 166 of the MV Act by proving the negligence on the part of the Driver of the offending vehicle. It is quite possible that in a given case, 'murder' can be an 'accident'. If only it amounts to an 'accident', can it lead to a claim petition, to be filed by the Claimants, seeking compensation in respect of such accident because of the use of the motor vehicle either under Section 163A or under Section 166 of the MV Act. The Claims Tribunal envisaged under Section 165 of the MV Act names the Tribunal as 'Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal' and if it is not an accident, no such claim can be held as maintainable, to be entertained by the Tribunal.[Para No.12]

    The question whether a murder can be an accident in a given case had come up for consideration before the Apex Court in Rita Devi (supra). It was a case where some unknown passengers hired an Autorickshaw from an autostand at Dimapur and later, the vehicle was reported stolen and the dead body of the Driver was recovered by the Police on the next day. The Autorickshaw was never recovered and the claim of the owner for the loss of Autorickshaw was considered and sanctioned by the Insurer, satisfying the amount for which it was settled. A claim petition was filed by the legal representatives of the deceased Driver under Section 163A of the MV Act, claiming compensation for the death as having arisen out of and in the course of his employment. The Tribunal held that it was caused by 'accident' coming within the purview of the MV Act and the owner and the Insurer were liable. The Insurance Company took up the matter before the High Court where it was held that there was no motor accident as contemplated under the MV Act and that it was an act of murder. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the award passed by the Tribunal was set aside. This led to the proceedings before the Apex Court where the question was subjected to a threadbare analysis; particularly on the point of 'dominant intention'. The Apex Court observed that there are instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts and that the difference between a murder 'which is not an accident' and a murder 'which is an accident' depends upon the proximity of the cause of murder. The Apex Court held that if the 'dominant intention' of the act of felony is to kill any particular person, then such killing is not an accidental murder but a 'murder simplicitor'; whereas, in a case where act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act, then such murder is an 'accidental murder'.[Para No.13]

Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating

Further, on careful reading of the charge, it appears that the Court has framed the charges of offences under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC. On reading of provisions of IPC, of which charges are framed against the petitioners as well as principle laid down in this regard by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various pronouncements, before applying the Section 409 of IPC, consideration of Section 405 of IPC is necessary. Bare reading of Section 405 IPC shows that the accused is either entrusted with a property or acquires dominion over the property and misappropriates the same dishonestly or converts the same for its own use or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property. In criminal breach of trust, the person comes into possession of a property honestly but he develops dishonest intention subsequent to his acquiring dominion over the property by way of entrustment or otherwise. To constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust following ingredients must be fulfilled:-

(i) There has to be some property.
(ii) The said property must be entrusted to someone with or without any contract.
(iii) The dominion of the property was shifted from complainant to the accused.
(iv) The accused person refuses to return/restore the said property to the rightful owner when demanded.
(v) The accused having misappropriated/converted to its own use/disposed the property refuses to restore the property to the complainant/lawful owner.

15. When offence of criminal breach of trust committed by any public servant or by banker merchant or agent then they shall be punished under Section 409 of IPC.

16. Further in order to apply section 420 IPC, the essential ingredients are:-

(i) cheating;
(ii) dishonestly inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security, and
(iii) mens-rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement."

17. Further, under the IPC, the cheating is defined in Section 415 and on reading of the said provision in the light of legal verdicts passed in this regard, the following ingredients are necessary to constitute the offence of cheating :-

(1) Deception of any person.
(2) (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person;
(i) to deliver any property to any person; or
(ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or
(b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.

Plaintiff must plead and prove specific instances of cruelty or intention of desertion for obtaining divorce

Section 13 (I) (i-a) clearly provides for grant of decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty which can be physical or mental.

Plaintiff in order to succeed in a suit for divorce on the ground of cruelty must plead and prove specific instances of cruelty or allege and prove such allegations, which if considered singularly or cumulatively make cohabitation impossible.Section 13 (i) (i-b) of Hindu Marriage Act 1955, on the other hand provides for grant of decree of divorce on the ground of 'desertion'. However, in order to seek decree of divorce on the ground of 'desertion', plaintiff must prove that he/she has been deserted for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately, preceding the presentation of the petition. Therefore, what implies from plain reading of Section 13 (i) (i-b) of Act 1955 is that defendant must have deserted petitioner for a continuous period of two years prior to the date of institution of suit. The aforesaid requirement can be termed as a necessary pre- condition for seeking a decree of divorce on ground of desertion. Therefore, it is imperative on the part of plaintiff to plead and prove that defendant has deserted plaintiff and has continued doing so uninterruptedly for a period of two years, prior to the institution of suit. Apart from aforesaid, the issue relating to separate living, (factum deserdendi) and intention of committing desertion (Animus deserdendi) have to be established.[Para. No.31]

Allegations made in plaint are vague and general and do not give specific instances of cruelty. Further allegation of cruelty alleged in plaint if considered either singularly or cumulatively do not lead to the conclusion that co-habitation is not possible.

No infirmity in the dismissal of suit for divorce.