There is no limitation of period for invoking High Court's inherent powers u/s.482 Cr.P.C.

If evidence is relevant, it is admissible irrespective of how it is obtained

The Investigating Agency has no power to appreciate the evidence

    Regarding limitation, although delay is duly explained in the petition, however, there is no applicability of Limitation Act on Section 482 Cr.P.C. being the inherent powers of this Court. The said section is starting itself with a non-obstante clause (Notwithstanding) therefore, this Court has power to exercise inherent powers where there is miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of law. Non-applicability of Limitation Act and non- providing of limitation period in Cr.P.C. with regard to Section 482 Cr.P.C., the intention of the legislature was not to restrict this Court to use these powers in appropriate cases. Thus, raising the issue of limitation period about Section 482 Cr.P.C. is itself contrary to the intention of legislature and the very section itself. In this regard, judgments relied upon by the respondent no.2 (complainant) are not applicable, as facts and circumstances of those cases are different from the case in hand.[Para No.49

    As far as the issue of source of document is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts including the case of Pushpadevi M. Jatia vs. M.L. Wadhavan & Ors.: (1987) 3 SCC 367 relied upon by respondent no.2 (complainant) held that the source of the evidence is not material, as long as it is admissible under the law, the same may be considered. If evidence is relevant, it is admissible irrespective of how it is obtained.[Para No.50]

.......

For the purpose of deciding the period of notice of termination of lease, only the purpose for which the property was let out has to be seen and subsequent change in user would not change the nature of lease

Coming to the issue regarding validity of notice issued under Section 106 of the Act, it would be noticed that the notice issued was dated 27.06.2015 and the tenancy was terminated w.e.f. 30.06.2015 i.e. within three days, however, the suit was filed on 04.08.2015 i.e. after about one month of giving of the notice. The provisions of Section 106 of the Act, inter-alia, provides that a lease of immovable property is terminable on part of either lessor or lessee by 15 days' notice and in case of lease of immovable property for agriculture or manufacturing purposes by six months' notice. However, sub-section (3) of Section 106 of the Act provides that a notice shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under sub-section (1), where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section and therefore, if it is found that the lease is for the purpose other than manufacturing purpose merely giving a three days' notice would not invalidate the proceedings.

    The appellant himself in his statement has clearly admitted that he was a tenant in the shop since 1976, in the year 1976, his shop was that of cloth in the name of Shankar Cloth Store, he changed his business in the year 1990-91 and started work of dye cutting of jewellery in the name of Mankad Jewellers.

  From the above statement, it is apparent that when the shop was let out in the year 1976, the same was neither for agriculture purpose nor for manufacturing purpose as the appellant was selling cloth only, however, in the year 1991, the use of shop was changed to manufacturing purpose. Whether in these circumstances, the issuance of notice by treating the lease for purpose other than manufacturing purpose i.e. notice for less than six months / filing the suit before expiry of six months from the date of notice would be in compliance of provisions of Section 106 of the Act?

   The various Courts have dealt with the said aspect and have come to the conclusion that the relevant purpose of lease under Section 106 of the Act is the purpose for which the lease was initially granted and subsequent change would not effect duration of the notice.

   Bombay High Court in the case of Ruprao Nagorao Mahulkar (supra), inter-alia, observed as under :-

"16. I, however, think that for the purposes of section 106 what is relevant is the purpose for which the lease was obtained at the time when the lease was obtained. A subsequent change of use and subsequent employment of the premises taken on lease for a manufacturing purpose where they were not at the commencement taken for that purpose would not entitle a lessee to take advantage of section 106. The purpose of the lease must be found arid ascertained with reference to the time when the lease was brought into existence. This seems to me also consistent and in accordance with the other provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and law in that behalf. Section 108 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act speaks of rights and liabilities of the lessees. In the absence of a contract of local usage to the contrary, a lessee is under an obligation by virtue of section 108 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act to use the leased premises for the purpose for which they were let and is obliged not to use them "for the purpose other than for which it was leased." To do so therefore, would be a, breach of the terms and conditions of the lease which are implied in the absence of the contract to the contrary. Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where a lease permits a re-entry on breach of a condition, then the lessor would be entitled to determine the lease and re- enter. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act also provides for termination of leases. A breach of terms and conditions of the lease would entitle a lessor to terminate the lease and to re-enter. In Devji's case (supra) Justice P.B. Mukherjee also observed that "the lease for manufacturing purpose must be a lease which at its inception is for that purpose. The lease at the time of the grant by the landlord must be impressed with the purpose of manufacture." Per contra-where it is not so impressed and where that was not the purpose at the time when the lease was commenced, the lessee would not be entitled to take advantage of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act."

...........

Complaint u/s. 138 of N.I. Act for cheque bounce is maintainable if cheque is presented and gets dishonoured for the second time after the period of first demand notice is expired

The expression ‘cause of action’ appearing in Section 142 (b) of the Act cannot therefore be understood to be limited to any given requirement out of the three requirements that are mandatory for launching a prosecution on the basis of a dishonoured cheque. Having said that<, every time a cheque is presented in the manner and within the time stipulated under the proviso to Section 138 followed by a notice within the meaning of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 and the drawer fails to make the payment of the amount within the stipulated period of fifteen days after the date of receipt of such notice, a cause of action accrues to the holder of the cheque to institute proceedings for prosecution of the drawer.[Para No.20]

    There is, in our view, nothing either in Section 138 or Section 142 to curtail the said right of the payee, leave alone a forfeiture of the said right for no better reason than the failure of the holder of the cheque to institute prosecution against the drawer when the cause of action to do so had first arisen. Simply because the prosecution for an offence under Section 138  must on the language of Section 142 be instituted within one month from the date of the failure of the drawer to make the payment does not in our view militate against the accrual of multiple causes of action to the holder of the cheque upon failure of the drawer to make the payment of the cheque amount. In the absence of any juristic principle on which such failure to prosecute on the basis of the first default in payment should result in forfeiture, we find it difficult to hold that the payee would lose his right to institute such proceedings on a subsequent default that satisfies all the three requirements of Section 138.[Para No.21]

    That brings us to the question whether an offence punishable under Section 138 can be committed only once as held by this Court in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra). The holder of a cheque as seen earlier can present it before a bank any number of times within the period of six months or during the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. This right of the holder to present the cheque for encashment carries with it a corresponding obligation on the part of the drawer to ensure that the cheque drawn by him is honoured by the bank who stands in the capacity of an agent of the drawer vis-à-vis the holder of the cheque. If the holder of the cheque has a right, as indeed is in the unanimous opinion expressed in the decisions on the subject, there is no reason why the corresponding obligation of the drawer should also not continue every time the cheque is presented for encashment if it satisfies the requirements stipulated in that clause (a) to the proviso to Section 138. There is nothing in that proviso to even remotely suggest that clause (a) would have no application to a cheque presented for the second time if the same has already been dishonoured once. Indeed if the legislative intent was to restrict prosecution only to cases arising out of the first dishonour of a cheque nothing prevented it from stipulating so in clause (a) itself. In the absence of any such provision a dishonour whether based on a second or any successive presentation of a cheque for encashment would be a dishonour within the meaning of Section 138 and clause (a) to proviso thereof. We have, therefore, no manner of doubt that so long as the cheque remains unpaid it is the continuing obligation of the drawer to make good the same by either arranging the funds in the account on which the cheque is drawn or liquidating the liability otherwise. It is true that a dishonour of the cheque can be made a basis for prosecution of the offender but once, but that is far from saying that the holder of the cheque does not have the discretion to choose out of several such defaults, one default, on which to launch such a prosecution. The omission or the failure of the holder to institute prosecution does not, therefore, give any immunity to the drawer so long as the cheque is dishonoured within its validity period and the conditions precedent for prosecution in terms of the proviso to Section 138 are satisfied.[Para No.22]

In computing period of 60/90 days for default bail u/s.167(2) of CrPC, first day of remand is to be included

The applicability of the aforesaid principle and also of the provision contained in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act would be of some semblance/relevance, where the law/statute prescribes a limitation and in terms of Section 9, if in any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897 it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘from’ and ‘for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word ‘to’. The principle would be attracted when a period is delimited by a Statute or Rule, which has both a beginning and an end; the word ‘from’ indicate the beginning and then the opening day is to be excluded and then the last day is included by use of words ‘to’. The requisite form for applicability of Section 9 is prescribed for a period ‘from’ and ‘to’, i.e. when the period is marked by terminus quo and terminus ad quem.

    If this principle is the underlining principle for applicability of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, perusal of Section 167 (2) would reveal that there is no starting point or an end point. In the scheme of the Code, as has been elaborated above, the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 167 runs in continuation of sub-section (2). Production of the accused before the Magistrate is a sequel of his arrest by the police in exercise of their power and the mandate of the police, and at the same time, a right of the accused to be produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours. The day on which the accused is brought on remand before the Magistrate, sub-section (2) of Section 167 empowers the Magistrate to authorize the detention with the police either by continuing it or remanding him to Magisterial custody. There cannot be a pause/break between the two processes. There is no de-limitation conceptualized in Section 167 nor can it be befitted into a period of limitation ‘from’ and ‘to’ as there is no limitation for completion of investigation and filing of the charge-sheet. The production before the Magistrate is a process in continuation of his arrest by the police and the Magistrate will authorize his detention for not more than 15 days in the whole but if he is satisfied that sufficient ground exist, he may authorise his detention beyond 15 days otherwise than in custody of police. There is no starting point or end point for the authorities to complete their action but if the investigation is not completed and charge-sheet not filed within 60 days or 90 days, a right accrues to the accused to be released on bail.

    The anterior period of custody with the police prior to the remand is no detention pursuant to an authorization issued from the Magistrate. The period of detention by the Magistrate runs only from the date of order of first remand. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C pertain to the power of the Magistrate to remand an accused and there is no reason why the first day has to be excluded. The sub-section finds place in a provision which prescribe the procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours and distinct contingencies are carved out in sub-section (2); the first being the Magistrate authorizing the detention of the accused for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole, secondly, when the Magistrate do not consider further detention necessary and thirdly, the Magistrate authorise the detention beyond period of 15 days if adequate grounds exists for doing so. However, there is no time stipulated as to extension of custody beyond period of 15 days with a maximum limit on the same. The accused can be in magisterial custody for unlimited point of time if he is not admitted to bail. In order to avoid the long incarceration of an accused for the mere reason that the investigation is being carried out in a leisurely manner, prompted the legislature to confer a right on the accused to be released on bail if he is prepared to do so and the investigation can still continue. This is the precise reason why the General clauses Act cannot be made applicable to sub-section (2) of Section 167 and the submission of Mr.Singh to the effect that the first day of remand will have to be excluded, would result into a break in the continuity of the custody of the accused which begin on his arrest and which could have continued till conclusion of investigation but for insertion of proviso to subsection (2) of Section 167.

There is no limitation period for 'victim' to file appeal against acquittal

Appeal u/s.372 by victim against acquittal - appeal by mother of deceased - definition of 'victim' - responsibility of the court recording acquittal

It is manifest that Section 372 of the Code relates to appeal from judgment or order of a Criminal Court. It gives to the victim the right to prefer an appeal against any adverse order passed by the trial Court. This amendment forms a part of the entire scheme under which the definition 'victim' was inserted by way of Section 2 (wa) of the Code, so as to allocate an active and constructive role to a victim of an offence in the judicial process arising from an offence.[Para No.8]

Section 2 (wa) of the Code defines the term 'victim' as to mean a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression 'victim' includes his or her guardian or legal heir.[Para No.9]

The applicant herein is not only informant / complainant but the mother of deceased also who was allegedly done to death by respondent No.1- husband. The victim of crime, taken in the natural and ordinary sense, was the applicant's daughter. However, now that actual crime victim is no more, the question arises as to whether the applicant being her mother can be recorded as a victim.[Para No.10]

As per proviso to Section 372, an appeal by victim shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court. That is to say appeal shall lie either before the Sessions Court or before the High Court, depending upon the Court which tried the case. No such statutory right existed prior to the amendment except under Section 378 (4) of the Code. Under Section 378 (4), a private party can challenge an acquittal by way of appeal only after getting special leave to appeal under Sub-Section (5) of Section 378 within six months if the complainant is a public servant, and within 60 days in every other case.[Para No.13]

We notice, however, that no period of limitation has been prescribed for the victim to prefer appeal against the judgment of acquittal in terms of proviso to Section 372 of the Code.[Para No.14]

It is common experience that in most of the cases informants are not so well educated or come from strata of society, lacking awareness and nuances involved in the proceedings. The semblance given to him/ her is that every care is taken by state machinery. This being so, he or she may not even know the outcome of the proceedings. Is it the duty of Public Prosecutor to ensure that the informant is informed about the judgment acquitting accused against whom he/ she had instituted the case?[Para No.28]

Sec.420 of IPC; in absence of elements of cheating, does not automatically extends the limitation of time barred complaint u/s. 138 of N.I.Act

Dishonor of cheque - demand notice issued - complainant alleges that after receipt of notice, accused assured for payment within two days but failed - complaint for the offences punishable u/s. 138 of N.I.Act and 420 of I.P.C. filed without any application for condonation of delay.

Held: If no elements of offence of 'cheating' are found in the complaint then cognizance has to be taken u/s.142(b) of N.I.Act. Sec.420 of IPC; in absence of elements of cheating, does not automatically extends the limitation of time barred complaint u/s. 138 of N.I.Act 

   In this regard, this Court is of the view that both in Section 138 and Section 142 of the NI Act, a special provision, distinct from the provisions of the CrPC in respect of limitation in taking cognizance has been made. It is apparent that the special statute rolls out distinctly different procedure. [Para No.6]

   It is equally well settled that if the special statute provides a different procedure, the provisions of the CrPC would not apply to the extent of inconsistency. [Para No.7]

Having regard to Section 138 and Section 142 of the NI Act, if the cognizance of dishonor of cheque for insufficiency of fund is taken in absence of element of 'cheating', the cognizance has to be taken under Section 142(b) of the NI Act. [Para No.8]

Bar of period of limitation is a mix question of facts and law

Plaint can not be rejected on the ground of bar by limitation

   Whether plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC if defendant claims the suit to be barred by limitations and disputes the time of accrual of cause of action?

Held:

   Plain can not be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of C.P.C. if accrual of cause of action as mentioned in the plaint is disputed to be beyond period of limitation.

   Genuineness of assertion in respect of accrual of cause of action is a mix question of facts and law.