After lapse of previous rent agreement if fresh rent agreement is not created, then the landlord can recover last payable rent but not the enhanced rent

The finding by both the learned Courts below on issue no.3 has been taken up for examination. In this regard, at the outset it must be seen that how far the Agreement for House Rent dated 29.02.2000 (Ext.3, also marked as Ext.D) can be read to determine the quantum of monthly rent for which the petitioner and proforma respondent no.2 had committed default, if there be any. In this regard, as per the provisions of Section 17(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 it is provided that leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent is required to be compulsorily registered. The consequences of non registration is prescribed in Section 49(c) of the said Act, which provides that no document required by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered. However, as per the proviso appended thereto, such document may be received as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. Therefore, when both the Courts below were examining the issue of rent payable after 01.03.2003, there was no written agreement in existence commencing from 01.03.2003. However, the rent payable during the tenure of the agreement was the purpose of agreement, as such, for the purpose of the quantum of the

rent payable for the period commencing from 01.03.2003 onwards, the said rent agreement (Ext.3, also exhibited as Ext.D) cannot be read in evidence. After 28.02.2003, the petitioner and respondent no.2 were holding the status of statutory tenant. In view of the discussions above, the evidence to the effect that as per the terms of Ext.3/Ext.D, the rent last payable under the said agreement was Rs.2,640/- per month.[Para No.22]

Dispute between landlord and tenant is arbitrable in case of lease and it is non arbitrable in case if Rent Act is applicable

Such equitable protection does not mean that the disputes relating to those aspects between the landlord and the tenant is not arbitrable and that only a Court is empowered to waive the forfeiture or not in the circumstance stated in the provision. In our view, when the disputes arise between the landlord and tenant with regard to determination of lease under the TP Act, the landlord to secure possession of the leased property in a normal circumstance is required to institute a suit in the Court which has jurisdiction. However, if the parties in the contract of lease or in such other manner have agreed upon the alternate mode of dispute resolution through arbitration the landlord would be entitled to invoke the arbitration clause and make a claim before the learned Arbitrator. Even in such proceedings, if the circumstances as contained in Section 114 and 114A of TP Act arise, it could be brought up before the learned Arbitrator who would take note of the same and act in accordance with the law qua passing the award. In other words, if in the arbitration proceedings the landlord has sought for an award of ejectment on the ground that the lease has been forfeited since the tenant has failed to pay the rent and breached the express condition for payment of rent or such other breach and in such proceedings the tenant pays or tenders the rent to the lessor or remedies such other breach, it would be open for the Arbitrator to take note of Section 114, 114A of TP Act and pass appropriate award in the nature as a Court would have considered that aspect while exercising the discretion.[Para No.16]

    On the other hand, the disputes arising under the Rent Acts will have to be looked at from a different view point and therefore not arbitrable in those cases. This is for the reason that

notwithstanding the terms and conditions entered into between the landlord and tenant to regulate the tenancy, if the eviction or tenancy is governed by a special statute, namely, the Rent Act the premises being amenable to the provisions of the Act would also provide statutory protection against eviction and the courts specified in the Act alone will be conferred jurisdiction to order eviction or to resolve such other disputes. In such proceedings under special statutes the issue to be considered by the jurisdictional court is not merely the terms and conditions entered into between the landlord and tenant but also other aspects such as the bonafide requirement, comparative hardship etc. even if the case for eviction is made out. In such circumstance, the Court having jurisdiction alone can advert into all these aspects as a statutory requirement and, therefore, such cases are not arbitrable. As indicated above, the same is not the position in matters relating to the lease/tenancy which are not governed under the special statutes but under the TP Act.[Para No.17]

No relief can be granted to the tenant on the ground of comparative hardship if he has never made any effort for searching alternative accomodation

So far as comparative hardship is concerned, it is undisputed fact that the petitioner has never attempted to search alternative space for shifting his business and law is very well settled on this point. The Apex Court as well as this Court has repeatedly held that it is necessarily required on the part of tenant to make full endeavour to search alternative accomodation to prove his comparative hardship after receiving copy of release application. In the matter of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra), the Court has clearly held that it is required on the part of tenant to make effort for searching alternative accomodation. Again in the matter of Salim Khan (supra), this Court, relying upon the judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court, was of the view that it is required on the part of petitioner to search accomodation after filing the release application and in the present case there is no dispute that the petitioner had never made any effort to search alternative accomodation. Not only this, the Court has also considered the Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 and considering the another judgment of Ganga Devi (supra), Court has taken the view that Rule 16 of Rules, 1972 would not come in the rescue of petitioner, in case, petitioner-tenant has not made any effort to search another accomodation. Here in the present case, there is no dispute on the point that petitioner has not made any effort to search alternative accomodation.

    In the matter of Sarju Prasad (supra), this Court has again taken the same view and held that in case effort was not made for alternative accomodation, this would be sufficient to tilt the balance of comparative hardship against the tenant. This view was again repeated by this Court in the case of Bachchu Lal (supra) and held that to prove the comparative hardship, it is necessarily required to make effort to search alternative accomodation, which is absolutely missing in the present case.

    Therefore, in light of fact that petitioner has never made any effort for searching alternative accomodation coupled with law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court, no relief can be granted to the petitioner on the ground of comparative hardship.

Even If landlord has multiple premises available with him still the tenant cannot dictate to him which of the premises he may seek to get vacated

Tenant can be evicted for bona fide requirement of married daughter of landlord even if such daughter or her husband is having resources to purchase other premisses

    In another decision rendered by a single Judge of our High Court in Vinod Gupta vs. Kailash Aggarwal & Ors. where the bona- fidé requirement of a married daughter was canvassed, the single Judge relying upon the decision in Sunder Singh Talwar (supra) has also referred to a 2014 decision as follows :

"14. Further in Rajender Prasad Gupta V. Rajeev Gagerna 2014 (114) DRJ 182, the Court held as follows :
"5. Having considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that the Trial Court has taken into consideration each of the contentions raised in the leave-to-defend and found them to be not triable issues. The reasons for and conclusion arrived at cannot be faulted. Furthermore, simply because the daughter of a marriageable age and allegedly likely to marry would not necessary cut her ties from her maternal family nor would the requirement for her accommodation in her father's house be lessened. Indeed, in the present times a daughter who is married-out, may like to retain her accommodation in her father's house which forms an emotional anchor and a place for refuge for all times. In times of an unfortunate marital discord such need becomes more acute should there be such a need.
    Conversely her family also would want to retain a room so as to re-assure her of a continued place of residence in her paternal home. A married daughter's ties with her paternal family do not end upon her marriage. For a married daughter her parents' home is always a refuge; an abode of reassurance and an abiding source of emotional strength and happiness. In the present case the daughter is a practicing advocate, i.e. a qualified professional, the need is all the more acute and bona fide. This Court finds, as did the Trial Court did, that no triable issues were raised in the leave-to- defend. Therefore, there was no need to grant leave or set the matter for trial. The reasons and the conclusion arrived at in the impugned order are correct and call for no interference." 

"15. Thus the law discussed above does not leave any room for further discussion on this topic. Admittedly the law as it stands, the daughters share equal rights in their parental properties as a son does, hence saying a married daughter severe (sic) all her relations with her father's family and would never be considered dependent upon the family's property, residential or commercial, that her parents own, would not be correct. Hence no fault can be found in impugned order even on this score."

(emphasis supplied) The single Judge thereby upheld the denial of leave-to-defend to the tenant.[Para No.16]

    While the ARC has clearly erred in holding that the requirement of a married daughter can never be considered while deciding the bona-fidé requirement of a landlord under section 14(1)(e) since a married daughter does not remain a member of the family, another question arises in the present case, and that is : whether in assessing the availability of suitable, alternate accommodation for the use of a married daughter, it is necessary to first assess the availability of such accommodation in the hands of the husband ; or is it permissible to assess the availability of such accommodation in the hands of the maternal family of the married daughter. In the opinion of this court, this question must be answered from the perspective of the eviction petitioner who seeks recovery of possession for the bona fidé requirement of a dependent family member. Accordingly, the availability of suitable, alternate accommodation is to be seen in the hands of the person filing the eviction petition, in this case the mother/landlady; and it is not relevant whether other relatives of the dependant family member have any alternate accommodation available. In this case, it is therefore not relevant whether the petitioner's sons-in-law have alternate accommodation or not.[Para No.17]

Tenant is not protected if he fails to pay rent after receipt of notice and during the trial as well as appeal proceeding

Maharashtra Rent Control Act - Eviction of tenant on the ground of default in payment of regular rent and illegal subletting - No rent is paid even after receipt of notice for eviction - Tenant disputed the standard rent but has not filed application for fixation of standard rent - Tenant made default in payment of regular rent in trial court and appellate court - Court commissioner report in respect of subletting filed but tenant has not filed his say thereon.

   The above enunciation, clarifies beyond doubt that the provisions of Clause (b) of Section 12(3) are mandatory, and must be strictly complied with by the tenant during the pendency of the suit or appeal if the landlord's claim for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent is to be defeated. The word "regularly" in Clause (b) of Section 12(3) has a significance of its own. It enjoins a payment or tender characterized by reasonable punctuality, that is to say, one made at regular times or intervals. The regularity contemplated may not be a punctuality, of clock like precision and exactitude, but it must reasonably conform with substantial proximity to the sequence of times or intervals at which the rent falls due. Thus, where the rent is payable by the month, the tenant must, if he wants to avail of the benefit of the latter part of Clause (b), tender or pay it every month as it falls due, or at his discretion in advance. If he persistently default during the pendency of the suit or appeal in paying the rent, such as where he pays it at irregular intervals of 2 or 3 or 4 months as is the case before us the Court has no discretion to treat what were manifestly irregular payments, as substantial compliance with the mandate of this Clause irrespective of the fact that by the time the Judgment was pronounced all the arrears had been cleared by the tenant.

{Mranalini B. Shaha and another Vs. Baplal Mohanlal Shaha (1980) 4 SCC 251} [Para No.16]

Photocopy of documents can not be impounded by civil court

Suit for eviction of tenant - tenant in his evidence produced photocopy of rent agreement - Landlord denied the same and objected - notice to produce the document was issued, but, landlord denied the very existence of rent agreement - document is not exhibited - Appellate court  impounded the photocopy of agreement to the payment of requisite stamp duty and penalty thereon and further ordered that after payment of the requisite stamp duty and penalty on the said document it be exhibited for the collateral purpose.

   Section 2(l) of the said Act, defines "instrument" and it reads as follows :

"instrument" includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded, but does not include a bill of exchange, cheque, promissory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of insurance, transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt;"

   A perusal of the said definition makes it clear that an "instrument" under the said Act is a document by which any right or liability is created or extinguished. Such a document would necessarily be the original of the said document and in this context, when Section 32(A) of the said Act is perused, it refers to "instrument" of conveyance, exchange, gift, etc. In a situation, where there is a short fall in payment of stamp duty, the Collector of the District has to give the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard and then determine the difference of amount of duty payable along with penalty and on payment of such amounts, "instrument" received shall be returned to the officer or the person concerned.

No bar of res judicata to second suit for eviction of tenant

Landlord filed suit for eviction on the grounds of bona fide requirement, erection of unauthorized permanent structures, change of user, and unlawful subletting - Suit dismissed - Appeal  was also unsuccessful - After less than three months, the landlord issued a "notice for possession" to the tenant and again filed second suit for eviction on the grounds of bona fide requirement, arrears of rent, and permanent construction on the suit premises

Is the second suit stand barred by res judicata and Section  12 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 ("the Bombay Rent Act")?

True, subsequent events may affect the suit outcome. For that, either party to the suit should bring to the court's notice those later developments. For that even the amended Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC provides. Otherwise, the court itself, in the interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, may take note of those developments. But law does not compel a person to invariably bring on record all the later developments through amendment. If the later developments provide an independent cause of action, the party's right to a fresh legal remedy remains intact. This proposition applies with more rigour if the cause of action is recurring.[Para No.54]

   Default in rent remittance provides recurring cause of action. Every successive default provides an independent cause of action.

Later developments may affect that cause of action if they are duly brought on record; otherwise, they provide further independent cause of action. Even the doctrine of lis pendens does not defeat the suitor's independent right to sue. It is only a matter of prudence and convenience that all the related facts are brought under one umbrella of adjudication. More particularly, if the cause of action is recurring, each instance of recurrence provides an independent cause of action.

Third party objector to execution of eviction decree, shall pay the arrears and rent to the landlord

   Eviction Suit - Decreed in favour of Landlord - Execution proceeding - Third party, who has been a witness in the original suit, obstructed execution under order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. - Such obstruction pertition dismissed - Appeal - Judgment Debtor Tenant directed to pay the compensation or mesne profits as a condition-precedent for staying the decree of eviction, the Tenant remained unresponsive.