Ocular evidence can be disbelieved if medical evidence makes ocular evidence improbable

Medical evidence Vs. oral evidence: which evidence has to be accepted?

   Thus, the position of law in cases where there is a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence can be crystallised to the effect, that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved.

40. In the instant case as referred to hereinabove, as many as five assailants attacked one person but the prosecution case from the very inception of FIR, is very clear that accused-appellant Darshan Pasi shot fire when the deceased was sitting under the tree, causing him injury on chest and left palm, Lachiman Pasi and Sahai Pasi fired on his neck and skull inside boundary wall and Maharaj Deen and Gaya Prasad assaulted the deceased with banka. This fact is categorically substantiated by P.W.-1 in his oral testimony. The postmortem report reveals no firearm injury, either on neck or skull or any other part of the dead body, whereas remaining injuries relate to sharp edged weapon, which may be attributed to alleged use of banka by Maharaj Deen and Gaya Prasad.

Divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her husband

Muslim divorced wife - entitlement of maintenance - sec.125 of CrPC - Sec. 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 - jurisdiction and power of family court to convert an application filed u/s.125 of CrPC into an application u/s. 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

Held: A divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her husband after the enactment of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women. However, under Section 3  read with Section 4 of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women, a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to an order of maintenance, if she is unable to maintain herself after the Iddat period and has not remarried.

Family Court would have jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act to entertain an application under Section 3 and 4 if The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

It is now settled that a divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her husband after the enactment of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women. However, under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women, a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to an order of maintenance, if she is unable to maintain herself after the Iddat period and has not remarried. Section 5 of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women provides that a divorced woman and her former husband might decide by an affidavit or any other declaration in writing, that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of Section 125 to 128 of the Cr.P.C.[Para No.56]

Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is an enabling provision which enables a divorced Muslim woman to make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of maintenance or mehr or dower or delivery of properties, as the case may be. The non- obstante clause is restricted to sub-section (1) of Section 3 and does not cover sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women. There is no conflict between Section 3(2) of the 1986 Act for Muslim women and the Family Courts Act. On the other hand, Section 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 gives overriding effect to the Family Courts Act notwithstanding anything therewith contained in any other law in force. The Family Court is to exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any other subordinate Civil court in respect of a proceeding for maintenance.