A stranger to the suit cannot be impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 of C.P.C. in a suit for specific performance merely to avoid multiplicity of the suits

Doctrine of lis pendency does not annul the conveyance or the transfer made during the pendency of suit.

    Liquidation proceedings are also fixed before the Company Law Board. For impleading a party in a suit for specific performance, two tests are to be satisfied. Firstly, there must be a right to some relief against the plaintiff in respect of suit property. Secondly, that in the absence of the petitioner/proposed defendant, no effective adjudication can be done by the trial Court.In a suit for specific performance, necessary party is that person in whose absence no decree can be passed. Proper party is that person whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court to decide and adjudicate the lis in an effective manner. A person stranger to the agreement to sell cannot be termed as necessary and appropriate party as collateral matters cannot be adjudicated in a suit for specific performance. By allowing such a course, the suit itself will be converted into a complicated suit for title.[Para No.18]

    The scope of a suit for specific performance cannot permit third party claiming to be joint owner in the property in question. A stranger to the agreement/contract making a claim adverse to the title of the defendant by claiming right of co- sharership in the suit property cannot be termed to be necessary party, nor proper party for adjudication of the case on merits. In this context reference can be made to Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal & Ors., 2005(2) R.C.R. (Civil) 691; Anil Kumar Singh vs. Shivnath Mishra @ Gadasa Guru, 1995(1) R.R.R. 660; Krishan Lal vs. Tek Chand, 1986(2) PLR 616 and Om Parkash and another vs. Rajni Gupta and another, 2008(1) R.C.R. (Civil) 400.[Para No.19]

     The ratio of Kasturi's case (supra) has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.5522-5523 of 2019 titled Gurmit Singh Bhatia vs. Kiran Kant Robinson and others decided on 17.07.2019. The plaintiff is a dominus litis and he cannot be compelled to contest the suit against a person with whom, he does not wish to contest. In Kasturi's case (supra), the Court held that the question of jurisdiction of Court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party, who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff, shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. Both the tests which have been discussed in the preceding paras are to be satisfied.[Para No.20]

    The party claiming independent title and possession adverse to the title of the vendor and not on the basis of agreement/contract, is not proper party and if said party is impleaded the scope of the suit for specific performance shall be enlarged and it will become a suit for title and it will involve intricated question of title which is not permissible in law. A stranger to the suit cannot be added/impleaded in a suit for specific performance merely in order to find out, who is in possession of the agreed property or to avoid multiplicity of the suits. A stranger to agreement cannot be impleaded as a party so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. It is only an assignee by sale in a case of specific performance who can be impleaded as party defendant. Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act enables the assignee by sale in a suit for specific performance to be impleaded as party. The aforesaid exception has been carved out in view of nature of suit being a specific performance, wherein the assignee by sale can protect his title and join the proceedings in view of law laid down in Thomson Press (India) Ltd.'s case (supra). It is a settled principle of law that doctrine of lis pendens is a doctrine based on the ground that it is necessary for the administration of justice that the decision of a Court in a suit should be binding not only on the litigating parties, but on those who derive title pendente lite. This provision does not intend to annul the conveyance or the transfer otherwise to render it subservient to the right of a party to a litigation.[Para No.21]

Neither District Administration nor Police have any powers to seize immovable property for violation of lockdown orders

The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order as contained in memo no.705/GO dated 26th April, 2020 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur- respondent no.2 with a further direction to the respondents to remove the seal from "The Alcor Hotel", situated at Holding No.4, Ramdas Bhatta, opposite Indian Oil Petrol Pump, Bistupur, Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum (hereinafter to be referred as 'the said premises')[Para No.2]

    The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner owns the Hotel Alcor, which provides facilities such as restaurants, bar, spa etc. On 25th April, 2020, a first information report being Bistupur P.S. Case no.87 of 2020 was registered under Sections 188, 269 & 270 of the Indian Penal Code; Section 54 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005; and Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, alleging that during the lockdown period, a raid was conducted on 25th April, 2020 in the Hotel Alcor wherein it was found that the spa was opened and few people including two girls were present in the conference hall, adjoining the spa. Seeing the raiding party, some persons fled away, however, three persons were apprehended on spot. Thereafter, the said premises was sealed on 26th April, 2020 by the Special Officer, Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee and the Executive Magistrate-cum-Incident Commander, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur in terms with the office order as contained in memo no.705/GO dated 26th April, 2020 passed by the respondent no.2. Another first information report, being Bistupur P.S. Case no.88 of 2020 was registered under Sections 3, 4, 5 & 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 against one of the Directors of the petitioner- Company, namely, Rajiv Singh Dugal and other accused persons on 27th April, 2020, alleging therein that one Sharad Poddar had kept a lady, namely, XXXXXXXXXX in the said hotel for last one month and had been establishing physical relationship with her since then. The petitioner vide letter dated 7th May, 2020 requested the Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur- respondent no.1 to unseal the hotel premises, so that day to day business of the petitioner-Company and firms having their registered offices located at Alcor Hotel Premises could function in a regular manner. The copies of the said letters were also sent to other authorities, however, no action in this regard was taken. The petitioner also served a reminder vide letter dated 15th May, 2020 to the respondent no.1, however, the same was also not responded. Hence the present writ petition.[Para No.3]

    To appreciate the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, it would be relevant to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Nevada Properties Private Limited through its Directors vs. state of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in 2019 SCC Online SC 1247. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted as under:-

"20. Section 102 postulates seizure of the property. Immovable property cannot, in its strict sense, be seized, though documents of title, etc. relating to immovable property can be seized, taken into custody and produced. Immovable property can be attached and also locked/sealed. It could be argued that the word 'seize' would include such action of attachment and sealing. Seizure of immovable property in this sense and manner would in law require dispossession of the person in occupation/possession of the immovable property, unless there are no claimants, which would be rare. Language of Section 102 of the Code does not support the interpretation that the police officer has the power to dispossess a person in occupation and take possession of an immovable property in order to seize it. In the absence of the Legislature conferring this express or implied power under Section 102 of the Code to the police officer, we would hesitate and not hold that this power should be inferred and is implicit in the power to effect seizure. Equally important, for the purpose of interpretation is the scope and object of Section 102 of the Code, which is to help and assist investigation and to enable the police officer to collect and collate evidence to be produced to prove the charge complained of and set up in the charge sheet. The Section is a part of the provisions concerning investigation undertaken by the police officer. After the charge sheet is filed, the prosecution leads and produces evidence to secure conviction. Section 102 is not, per se, an enabling provision by which the police officer acts to seize the property to do justice and to hand over the property to a person whom the police officer feels is the rightful and true owner. This is clear from the objective behind Section 102, use of the words in the Section and the scope and ambit of the power conferred on the Criminal Court vide Sections 451 to 459 of the Code. The expression 'circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence' in Section 102 does not refer to a firm opinion or an adjudication/finding by a police officer to ascertain whether or not 'any property' is required to be seized. The word 'suspicion' is a weaker and a broader expression than 'reasonable belief' or 'satisfaction'. The police officer is an investigator and not an adjudicator or a decision maker.This is the reason why the Ordinance was enacted to deal with attachment of money and immovable properties in cases of scheduled offences. In case and if we allow the police officer to 'seize' immovable property on a mere 'suspicion of the commission of any offence', it would mean and imply giving a drastic and extreme power to dispossess etc. to the police officer on a mere conjecture and surmise, that is, on suspicion, which has hitherto not been exercised. We have hardly come across any case where immovable property was seized vide an attachment order that was treated as a seizure order by police officer under Section 102 of the Code. The reason is obvious. Disputes relating to title, possession, etc., of immovable property are civil disputes which have to be decided and adjudicated in Civil Courts. We must discourage and stall any attempt to convert civil disputes into criminal cases to put pressure on the other side (See Binod Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014)10SCC663). Thus, it will not be proper to hold that Section 102 of the Code empowers a police officer to seize immovable property, land, plots, residential houses, streets or similar properties. Given the nature of criminal litigation, such seizure of an immovable property by the police officer in the form of an attachment and dispossession would not facilitate investigation to collect evidence/material to be produced during inquiry and trial. As far as possession of the immovable property is concerned, specific provisions in the form of Sections 145 and 146 of the Code can be invoked as per and in accordance with law. Section 102 of the Code is not a general provision which enables and authorises the police officer to seize immovable property for being able to be produced in the Criminal Court during trial. This, however, would not bar or prohibit the police officer from seizing documents/papers of title relating to immovable property, as it is distinct and different from seizure of immovable property. Disputes and matters relating to the physical and legal possession and title of the property must be adjudicated upon by a Civil Court.

21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Reference is answered by holding that the power of a police officer under Section 102 of the Code to seize any property, which may be found under circumstances that create suspicion of the commission of any offence, would not include the power to attach, seize and seal an immovable property."[Para No.12]

    The Hon'ble Supreme court in the aforesaid judgment has held that Section 102 Cr.P.C. postulates seizure of the property. However, an immovable property cannot, in its direct sense, be seized, though documents of title etc. relating to immovable properties can be seized, taken into custody and produced. Language of Section 102 Cr.P.C. does not support the interpretation that the police officer has the power to dispossess a person who is in occupation, to take possession of an immovable property in order to seize it.[Para No.13]

    It is, thus, well settled that the power of sealing of property carries civil consequences. A person can be deprived of the property only by following due procedure in accordance with law. No person shall be deprived of the right of property, except by the procedure prescribed under law.[Para No.16]